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TWENTY YEARS OF WEB SCRAPING AND THE 
COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT 
ANDREW SELLARS† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At the start of 2017, scientists worried that the incoming presidential admin-
istration would remove politically inconvenient environmental information 
from government websites.1 In response a group of faculty and students 
formed the Environmental Data & Governance Initiative.2 The initiative 
launched a number of projects to monitor and preserve federally-hosted scien-
tific data on government databases.3 This effort led the group to discover that 
the National Park Service had removed ninety-two documents related to efforts 
to reduce carbon emissions under the “Climate Friendly Parks Program,” 
which (once confronted) the Service then promised to re-post.4 
 
 † Lecturer and Clinical Instructor, Boston University School of Law; Director, 
BU/MIT Technology & Cyberlaw Law Clinic. Thanks to Stacey Dogan, Jonathan Frankle, 
and Ahmed Ghappour for their valuable comments; to my symposium co-panelists Jamie 
Lee Williams and David Thaw, and moderator Paul Gugliuzza, for their thought-provoking 
contributions; and to current and former BU Law students Danielle Deluty, Kaitlin Heinen, 
Cliff Sonkin, and Yajing Wen for their research assistance. 
 1 This concern bore out, Oliver Milman & Sam Morris, Trump is Deleting Climate 
Change, One Site at a Time, GUARDIAN (May 14, 2017) https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/may/14/donald-trump-climate-change-mentions-government-websites 
[https://perma.cc/2P7C-YZA8], although the EPA did preserve a snapshot of the website as 
it existed on the last day of the prior administration, see EPA’s January 19 Snapshot, EPA, 
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/G94G-
GB9E]. 
 2 About, ENVTL. DATA & GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, https://envirodatagov.org/about/ (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2018) [https://perma.cc/3KQ9-32SH]. 
 3 Website Monitoring, ENVTL. DATA & GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, 
https://envirodatagov.org/website-monitoring/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/D7TV-5MRL]. 
 4 Sarah Emerson, The National Park Service Promises to Reinstate 92 Climate Change 
Documents Removed from Website, MOTHERBOARD (Dec. 22, 2017), 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/j5vpak/the-national-park-service-promises-to-
reinstate-92-climate-change-pages-removed-from-website [https://perma.cc/E22X-DXYD]. 
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A few years earlier, Alexis Madrigal sought to understand the strange “mi-
crogenres” that the online video platform Netflix creates for its users, like 
“Critically-Acclaimed Crime Movies from the 1940s,” “Visually Striking Latin 
American Comedies,” or “Suspenseful TV Shows Featuring a Strong Female 
Lead.”5 He discovered that Netflix hosted these genres on a section of its web-
site, and by using a tool that gathered all 76,897 of them, Madrigal was able to 
learn how these classifications were structured and deployed.6 He then used 
this research to secure an interview with the team at Netflix who developed the 
elaborate tagging system, and wrote up an extensive analysis of it for The At-
lantic.7 
Historian Jason Scott focuses instead on Internet preservation.8 Scott is the 
founder of an online collective known as Archive Team, who watch for the 
closure of famous social websites from earlier days in Internet history and 
make as full a backup of the website as possible before the site is taken down.9 
Once-popular websites like Geocities, Friendster, and Miiverse, now gone 
from their original domains, are preserved by Archive Team, providing new 
opportunities for scholars to analyze these now-defunct platforms.10 
Each of these projects was possible thanks to an Internet research technique 
known as “web scraping.” Web scraping generally refers to the retrieval of 
content posted on the World Wide Web through the use of a program other 
than a web browser or an application programming interface (API).11 In most 
cases this is done through a computer script that will send tailored queries to 
websites to retrieve specific pieces of content. These requests are often sent in 
an automatically generated series of requests, in order to extract material 
 
 5 Madrigal maintains a public list of these “microgenres.” Alexis Madrigal, Netflix Mi-
crogenres, GOOGLE DOCS, 
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1XyswDlnyP6dlLyL8brhTFfTORFm-
GZ2MnwTPEgp0HCc/ [https://perma.cc/VK5J-STBS] (last visited Mar. 6, 2018). 
 6 Alexis C. Madrigal, How Netflix Reverse Engineered Hollywood, ATLANTIC (Jan. 2, 
2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/01/how-netflix-reverse-
engineered-hollywood/282679/ [https://perma.cc/FW8W-XCNN]. 
 7 Id. 
 8 See ARCHIVE TEAM, https://archiveteam.org/ (last updated June 28, 2015) 
[https://perma.cc/MS24-9JF7]. 
 9 Matt Schwartz, Fire in the Library, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 20, 2011), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/426434/fire-in-the-library/ [https://perma.cc/N3M4-
HJEV]. 
 10 See Ian Milligan, Finding Community in the Ruins of Geocities: Distantly Reading a 
Web Archive (Oct. 2015), 
https://uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/bitstream/handle/10012/11650/milligan-s.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RQ3U-VTLF]. 
 11 RYAN MITCHELL, WEB SCRAPING WITH PYTHON viii–ix (2015). Though as noted below, 
it goes by several other names as well, with disagreement as to whether the terms refer to 
different acts, and the precise definition can be somewhat fluid. See infra notes 57–82 and 
accompanying text. 
SELLARS - MACROED 8.6.18.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/11/18  11:38 AM 
374 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. [Vol. 24:372 
 
across an array of websites or a large collection of material from a specific 
website.12 
The technique has countless applications. It can be used to preserve web-
sites,13 help identify and extract data for analysis,14 aggregate information from 
disparate sources,15 and map out unexplored networks of servers and web-
sites.16 Its use can help competition by lowering startup information barriers,17 
enable consumers to find deals and discounts in online services,18 identify and 
correct issues of algorithmic bias,19 and introduce new forms of humor and 
playfulness.20 (The technique is capable of less appealing uses as well. It can 
facilitate an invasion of one’s sense of privacy,21 expose content that a website 
host wished instead to remain hidden,22 facilitate copyright infringement at 
 
 12 See infra notes 101-116 and accompanying text. 
 13 See, e.g., PERMA.CC, https://perma.cc/ [https://perma.cc/MT6S-EQ3M] (last visited 
July 28, 2018) (providing a tool to archive websites in scholarly and judicial publications to 
avoid “link rot”). 
 14  See generally DANIEL T. LAROSE & CHANTAL D. LAROSE, DISCOVERING KNOWLEDGE 
IN DATA: AN INTRODUCTION TO DATA MINING (2d ed. 2014). 
 15 KIMBERLY ISBELL & CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT, THE RISE OF THE NEWS 
AGGREGATOR: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS AND BEST PRACTICES 1–2 (2010), 
https://cyber.harvard.edu/publications/2010/news_aggregator_legal_implications_best_pract
ices [https://perma.cc/7FSN-TFW7]. 
 16 See, e.g., Qinqhua Zheng et al., Learning to Crawl Deep Web, 38 INFO. SYS. 801, 801 
(2013). 
 17 See Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1285–89 (2017). 
 18 See Complaint, Sw. Airlines Co. v. Roundpipe LLC, No. 3:18-CV-33 (N.D. Tex. filed 
Jan. 5, 2018) (filed by an airline against a scraper that allowed customers to take advantage 
of rebooking deals within their reservation system). 
 19 Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix AI’s Implicit Bias Problem, 93 
WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (arguing that broader access to datasets can help correct 
bias in how algorithms are currently trained). 
 20 See, e.g., Chez LA, COMEDY HACK DAY (Aug. 27, 2015), 
http://www.comedyhackday.org/demosmade/2015/8/27/chez-la [https://perma.cc/9FHJ-
MN27] (aggregating information that aspiring young actors purportedly need for their move 
to Los Angeles — and then home again when dreams of stardom do not pan out); Erowid 
Coin Bot (@icowid), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/icowid [https://perma.cc/U862-YLPU] 
(last updated Mar. 2, 2018) (posting content scraped from whitepapers for cryptocurrency 
initial coin offerings, mixed with posts about of bad experiences from a recreational drug 
website, to highlight the cultish tendencies of both communities). 
 21 Zachary Gold & Mark Latonero, Robots Welcome? Ethical and Legal Considerations 
for Web Crawling and Scraping, 13 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 275, 282–83 (2018); Joseph 
Cox, 70,000 OkCupid Users Just Had Their Data Published, MOTHERBOARD (May 12, 
2016), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/8q88nx/70000-okcupid-users-just-had-
their-data-published [https://perma.cc/HZ2A-ESWT]. 
 22 See, e.g., In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 575 F.3d 279, 291 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(admonishing a judge for misconduct after he hosted pornographic images on a private web 
server, which were unintentionally indexed by search engines). 
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scale,23 enable new forms of surveillance,24 or help people cheat in online triv-
ia games.25) Given its utility, the technique has been adopted widely. One 
company estimates that about a quarter of all current web traffic comes from 
web scrapers.26 
Web scraping has proliferated beneath the shadow of the federal anti-
hacking statute, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).27 For those who 
do not want their websites scraped, the CFAA presents a possible remedy 
through its broad prohibition against obtaining information by accessing a 
computer without authorization or by exceeding one’s authorized access.28 
While first drawn to regulate only “federal interest computers,”29 the statute 
grew to govern most Internet-connected computers by the late 1990s, when 
courts considered its application to web scraping.30 Criminal cases have been 
brought against scrapers,31 but the real area of growth has been with the 
 
 23 Bob Bardwell, Don’t Get Scraped: Putting an End to Web Scraping, Content Theft, 
RACKSPACE BLOG (June 14, 2012), https://blog.rackspace.com/dont-get-scraped-putting-an-
end-to-web-scraping-content-theft [https://perma.cc/8VDZ-Q2SC]. 
 24 Jonathan Frankle, How Russia’s New Facial Recognition App Could End Anonymity, 
ATLANTIC (May 23, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/05/find-
face/483962/ [https://perma.cc/D84K-GSLY]. 
 25 Aaron Mak, Developers are Creating Bots that Can Help People Cheat at HQ Trivia, 
SLATE (Jan. 24, 2018), https://slate.com/technology/2018/01/bots-can-greatly-assist-players-
in-the-popular-hq-trivia-game.html [https://perma.cc/82F6-N9BK]. 
 26 The company found a little more than half of all web traffic as coming from bots, and 
a little more than half of those were what the company called “bad bots,” which appear to be 
oriented toward taking down websites by overwhelming them with requests rather than re-
trieving information in a systemic way. Igal Zeifman, Bot Traffic Report 2016, IMPERVA 
INCAPSULA (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.incapsula.com/blog/bot-traffic-report-2016.html 
[https://perma.cc/76NC-B4BV]. 
 27 Enacted first in 1984 under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, and then expanded 
as the CFAA in 1986. See Orin Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1563-65 (2010) [hereinafter Kerr, Vagueness]. 
 28 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2012). 
 29 Defined in earlier versions as a computer used in whole or part by a financial institu-
tion or the United States government, or a crime affecting multiple computers in multiple 
states. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2) (1987). 
 30 By then the CFAA had already extended to cover computers used in all interstate and 
foreign commerce, and expanded crimes to cover unauthorized access to any kind of infor-
mation involved in interstate and foreign communication. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2)(C), 
(e)(2)(B) (1996); see Kerr, Vagueness, supra note 27, at 1566–67. In 2001 the statute had 
broadened to cover access to foreign computers. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (2001). In 2008 
the statute’s scope grew to cover access to even more forms of information. See Kerr, 
Vagueness, supra note 27, at 1569. 
 31 Some of the more famous prosecutions of scraping under the CFAA include the prose-
cution of Aaron Swartz, United States v. Swartz, No. 11-cr-10260 (D. Mass. filed July 14, 
2011), Andrew Auernheimer, United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 2014), 
the company TomorrowNow, Press Release, TomorrowNow, Inc., Sentenced on Computer 
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CFAA’s corresponding civil provisions. These allow aggrieved parties to file a 
lawsuit to obtain damages and injunctive relief, so long as they show that they 
suffered a loss during a one-year period aggregating to at least $5000 in val-
ue.32 As this loss calculation has included expenses like personnel time spent to 
determine the nature and extent of a scraper’s activity, and possibly even mon-
ey spent to hire an attorney to look into a CFAA claim,33 it is almost always 
met.34 
And so both web scraping and lawsuits about web scraping have become 
more common — so much so that in one current case, each side has now 
brought CFAA claims against the other for scraping its site.35 But at the same 
time, practical advice on the legality of web scraping is hard to come by,36 and 
 
Intrusion and Copyright Infringement Charges, FBI (Sept. 14, 2011), 
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/sanfrancisco/press-releases/2011/tomorrownow-inc.-
sentenced-on-computer-intrusion-and-copyright-infringement-charges 
[hhtps://perma.cc/85UK-HA6N], and most recently, the founder of Oilpro.com, Press Re-
lease, Oilpro.com Founder Sentenced to Prison for Hacking into Competitor’s Computer 
System, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/oilprocom-
founder-sentenced-prison-hacking-competitor-s-computer-system [https://perma.cc/XK7L-
PQ2V]. A case was also brought against the creators of the Wiseguys ticket purchasing as-
sistant, though the tool in this case appears to help users rapidly complete an online transac-
tion rather than extract information. See United States v. Lowson, 10-cr-114, 2010 WL 
9552416 (D.N.J. Oct. 12, 2010). 
 32 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2012) (“A civil action for violation of this section may be 
brought only if the conduct involves 1 of the factors set forth in subclauses (I), (II), (III), 
(IV), or (V) of subsection (c)(4)(A)(i).”). This is just one possible ground for a civil action. 
The others, which do not appear to arise in any web scraping cases to date, address modifi-
cation of medical equipment, physical injury, a threat to public health or safety, or damage 
affecting a federal computer used in certain key security and administration of justice func-
tions. Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i). 
 33 Case law on this point is contradictory. The court in Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, 
Inc. recently allowed recovery of attorney fees based on prior unchallenged conclusions to 
that effect in earlier proceedings in the case, and an independent reading of the definition of 
“loss” under the CFAA. 252 F. Supp. 3d 765, 777–78 (N.D. Cal. 2017), appeal filed No. 17-
16161 (9th Cir. June 2, 2017). Other cases exclude attorney fees, or at least those incurred 
during the litigation itself. Healthcare Advocates, Inc. v. Harding, Earley, Follmer & 
Frailey, 497 F. Supp. 2d 627, 647–48 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 34 See, e.g., Frisco Med. Ctr., L.L.P. v. Bledsoe, 147 F. Supp. 3d 646, 660 (E.D. Tex. 
2015); but see Citizens Info. Assocs. v. Justmugshots.com, No. 1-12-CV-573-LY, 
2013 WL 12076563, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2013) (finding claim of loss in that case “en-
tirely conclusory”). 
 35 See DHI Grp., Inc. v. Kent, No. CV H-16-1670, 2017 WL 4837730, at *3-4 (S.D. Tex. 
Oct. 26, 2017). 
 36 Some of the most helpful pieces advising scrapers include Esha Bhandari & Rachel 
Goodman, Data Journalism and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Tips for Moving For-
ward in an Uncertain Landscape (Nw. Computation+Journalism Symposium, 2017) and  
James Snell & Nicola Menaldo, Web Scraping in an Era of Big Data 2.0, BLOOMBERG LAW 
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rarely extends beyond a rough combination of “try not to get caught” and “talk 
to a lawyer.”37 Most often the legal status of scraping is characterized as some-
thing just shy of unknowable, or a matter entirely left to the whims of courts, 
plaintiffs, or prosecutors.38 This legal uncertainty leads to confusion and disar-
ray on the ethical side as well, as researchers and academic publishers struggle 
with how to approach scraper-based research that may or not have broken a 
law.39 There is also a relatively small amount of legal scholarship that address-
es web scraping,40 and the most directly on point emphasizes that the “legal 
doctrines involved in scraping suits are in flux.”41 
Uncertainty does indeed exist in the caselaw, and may stem in part from 
how courts approach the act of web scraping on a technical level. The few 
courts that go beyond analogies to the physical world usually describe web 
scraping as being akin to the actions of a human web browser, but at a far fast-
er rate.42 This description risks misstating the act of web scraping in a way that 
could affect the outcome of CFAA cases. The first goal of this piece, in Sec-
tion II, is to clarify how web scrapers operate, and explain why one should not 
think of web scraping as being inherently more burdensome or invasive than 
humans browsing the web. 
 
(June 8, 2016), https://www.bna.com/web-scraping-era-n57982073780/ 
[https://perma.cc/6NQA-LJAM]. 
 37 Some of the analysis, especially in non-legal literature, can be far worse, at best under-
inclusive and at worst simply wrong. See DAVID GOURLEY & RYAN TOTTY, HTTP: THE 
DEFINITIVE GUIDE 218 (2002) (noting that taking down a website can be grounds for legal 
claims, but without discussion of the legal concerns around accessing a website in the first 
place); KEVIN HEMENWAY & TARA CALISHAIN, SPIDERING HACKS 17 (2004) (suggesting that 
scraping won’t cause liability so long as “your spiders are behaving and your intent is fair”); 
MITCHELL, supra note 11, at vii (“Some people aren’t sure if it’s legal (it is)[.]”). 
 38 See Jeffrey K. Hirschey, Symbiotic Relationships: Pragmatic Acceptance of Data 
Scraping, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 897, 897 (2014) (describing the “the already uncertain 
legal background of scraping case law”); Rami Essaid, Is Web Scraping Illegal? It Depends 
on what the Meaning of the Word Is Is, DISTIL NETWORKS, 
https://resources.distilnetworks.com/all-blog-posts/is-web-scraping-illegal-depends-on-
what-the-meaning-of-the-word-is-is [https://perma.cc/E4NY-AZ54] (last visited July 28, 
2018); Gold & Latonero, supra note 22, at 296. 
 39 See Amy Bruckman, Do Researchers Need to Abide by Terms of Service (TOS)? An 
Answer, NEXT BISON (Feb. 26, 2016), https://nextbison.wordpress.com/2016/02/26/tos/ 
[perma.cc/76JW-EXQG]. 
 40 E.g., Christine G. Davik, Access Denied: Improper Use of the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act to Control Information on Publicly Accessible Internet Websites, 63 MD. L. REV. 
320 (2004); Niva Elkin-Koren, Let the Crawlers Crawl: On Virtual Gatekeepers and the 
Right to Exclude Indexing, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 165 (2001); Hirschey, supra note 
39; Nicholas A. Wolfe, Using the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to Secure Public Data 
Exclusivity, 13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 301 (2015). 
 41 Hirschey, supra note 39, at 926. 
 42 See infra notes 86–92 and accompanying text. 
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The second goal of this piece, in Section III, is to more fully articulate how 
courts approach the all-important question of whether a web scraper accesses a 
website without authorization under the CFAA. I aim to suggest here that there 
is a fair amount of madness in the caselaw, but not without some method. Spe-
cifically, this piece breaks down the twenty years of web scraping litigation 
(and the sixty-one opinions43 that this litigation has generated) into four rough 
 
 43 The cases identified, in chronological order, are eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 
F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001); 
EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2003); Register.com, Inc. v. 
Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004); Sw. Airlines Co. v. Farechase, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 
2d 435 (N.D. Tex. 2004); Traveljungle v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 212 S.W.3d 841 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2006); Facebook, Inc. v. ConnectU LLC, 489 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (N.D. Cal. 2007); 
Healthcare Advocates, Inc. v. Harding, Early, Follmer & Frailey, 497 F. Supp. 2d 627 (E.D. 
Pa. 2007); Tamburo v. Dworkin, No. 04-cv-3317, 2007 WL 3046216 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 
2007); Ticketmaster LLC v. RMG Techs., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2007); 
A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Va. 2008); A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. 
iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009); Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. 
08-cv-5780, 2009 WL 1299698 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2009); CollegeSource, Inc. v. Acade-
myOne, Inc., No. 08-cv-1987, 2009 WL 2705426 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2009); Tamburo v. 
Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2010); Snap-On Bus. Sols., Inc. v. O’Neil & Assocs., Inc., 
708 F. Supp. 2d 669 (N.D. Ohio 2010); Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. 08-cv-
5780, 2010 WL 3291750 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2010); Snapt Inc. v. Ellipse Comm’ns Inc., No. 
09-cv-661, 2010 WL 11542003 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2010); Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini St., 
Inc., No. 10-cv-106, 2010 WL 3257833 (D. Nev. Aug. 13, 2010); Oracle Corp. v. SAP AG, 
734 F. Supp. 2d 956 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 2d 927 
(E.D. Va. 2010); Snapt Inc. v. Ellipse Comm’ns Inc., No. 09-cv-661, 2010 WL 11542004 
(N.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2010); Tamburo v. Dworkin, No. 04-cv-3317, 2010 WL 5476780 (N.D. 
Ill. Dec. 29, 2010); Snapt Inc. v. Ellipse Comm’ns Inc., 430 Fed. App’x 346 (5th Cir. 2011); 
CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2011); VRCompliance 
LLC v. HomeAway, Inc., No. 11-cv-1088, 2011 WL 6779320 (E.D. Va. Dec. 27, 2011); 
Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2012); EarthCam, 
Inc. v. Oxblue Corp., No. 11-cv-2278, 2012 WL 12836518 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 2012); 
Dream Marriage Grp., Inc. v. Anastasia Int’l, Inc., No. 10-cv-5034, 2012 WL 3024227 
(C.D. Cal. July 23, 2012); CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., No. 10-cv-3542, 2012 
WL 5269213 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2012); United States v. Auernheimer, No. 11-cr-470, 2012 
WL 5389142 (D.N.J. Oct. 26, 2012); Citizens Info. Assocs. v. Justmugshots.com, No. 12-
cv-573, 2012 WL 12874898 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2012); Citizens Info. Assocs. v. Justmug-
shots.com, No. 12-cv-573, 2013 WL 12076563 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2013); Craigslist Inc. v. 
3Taps. Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962 (N.D. Cal. 2013); VRCompliance LLC v. HomeAway, 
Inc., 715 F.3d 570 (4th Cir. 2013); EarthCam, Inc. v. Oxblue Corp., 11-cv-2278, 2013 WL 
11904713 (N.D. Ga. July 19, 2013); Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178 
(N.D. Cal. 2013); Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 08-cv-5780, 2013 WL 5372341 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2013); Tamburo v. Dworkin, 974 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (N.D. Ill. 2013); 
Fidlar Techs. v. LPS Real Estate Data Sols., Inc., No. 13-cv-4021, 2013 WL 5973938 (C.D. 
Ill. Nov. 8, 2013); United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 2014); EarthCam, 
Inc. v. Oxblue Corp., 49 F. Supp. 3d 1210 (N.D. Ga. 2014); CollegeSource, Inc. v. Acade-
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phases of thinking around the critical question of when a scraper access a com-
puter “without authorization” or if it “exceeds authorized access.” 
The first phase runs through the first decade of scraping litigation, and is 
marked with cases that adopt an expansive interpretation of the CFAA, with 
the potential to extend to all scrapers, so long as a website can point to some 
mechanism to signal that the access was unauthorized, be that contractual, 
technical, or otherwise.44 In the second phase, starting in the late 2000s and 
following an influential wave of cases which began to adopt a “narrow” view 
of the CFAA,45 courts began to deny claims in scraping cases where websites 
merely placed restrictions on the use of the data hosted on their site as opposed 
to restrictions on access to a website, and looked more towards code-based 
controls to interpret the scope of a scraper’s authorization.46 This approach 
 
myOne, Inc., 597 Fed. App’x 116 (3d Cir. 2015); Fidlar Techs. v. LPS Real Estate Data 
Sols., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 844 (C.D. Ill. 2015); QVC, Inc. v. Resultly, LLC, 99 F. Supp. 3d 
525 (E.D. Pa. 2015); CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 08-cv-1987, 2015 WL 
5638104 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2015); Fidlar Techs. v. LPS Real Estate Data Sols., Inc., 810 
F.3d 1075 (7th Cir. 2016); QVC, Inc. v. Resultly, LLC, 159 F. Supp. 3d 576 (E.D. Pa. 
2016); CouponCabin LLC v. Savings.com, Inc., No. 14-cv-39, 2016 WL 3181826 (N.D. 
Ind. June 8, 2016); Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini St., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (D. Nev. 
2016); Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 828 F.3d 1068, opinion superseded on denial 
of reh’g en banc 844 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2016); CouponCabin LLC v. Savings.com, Inc., 
No. 14-cv-39, 2017 WL 83337 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 10, 2017); DHI Grp., Inc. v. Kent, No. 16-cv-
1670, 2017 WL 1088352 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2017); Heritage Capital Corp. v. Christie’s Inc., 
No. 16-cv-3404, 2017 WL 1550514 (N.D. Tex. May 1, 2017); Facebook, Inc. v. Power 
Ventures, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 3d 765 (N.D. Cal. 2017); EarthCam, Inc. v. Oxblue Corp., 703 
Fed. App’x 803 (11th Cir. 2017); hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099 
(N.D. Cal. 2017); DHI Grp., Inc. v. Kent, No. 16-cv-1670, 2017 WL 4837730 (S.D. Tex. 
Oct. 26, 2017); Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini St., Inc., 879 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2018); Sandvig 
v. Sessions, No. 16-cv-1638 (JDB), 2018 WL 1568881 (D.D.C. March 30, 2018). As noted 
below, a little less than two-thirds of these go beyond procedural issues or passing mentions 
of CFAA claims to actually examine the substance of how the law applies. This list also 
does not consider cases concerning the related-but-distinct technique of using automated 
scripts to complete online transactions. See, e.g., Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. Prestige Entm’t, 
Inc., No. 17-cv-7232, 2018 WL 654410 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2018) (defendant wrote script to 
rapidly acquire large numbers of event tickets); Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. 
Supp. 2d 1039 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (defendant wrote scripts to batch-post material onto online 
classifieds service). It also does not look at cases where automatic requests for websites 
were used to deliberately overwhelm a website server in a “denial of service attack.” See, 
e.g., United States v. Yücel, 97 F. Supp. 3d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 44 See infra Section III.A. 
 45 Jonathan Mayer, The “Narrow” Interpretation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: 
A User Guide for Applying United States v. Nosal, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1644, 1657 
(2016) [hereinafter Mayer, The “Narrow” Interpretation]. Notable cases include LVRC 
Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) and United States v. Nosal (Nosal 
I), 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). For further analysis of this trend, see, e.g., Wolfe, 
supra note 40. 
 46 See infra Section III.B. 
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tended to benefit web scrapers, because (as noted in Section II) in most cases a 
scraper confronts no further code-based restriction than a human would at a 
web browser, and barriers like a website’s terms of use tend to limit only the 
use of information, rather than access to information, making them unsuitable 
grounds for a CFAA claim under this newly-narrowed view.47 
But in a shift that has gone less observed, a third phase of analysis has 
grown over the last half-decade, which brings interpretation of the CFAA back 
into the older, broader view. This change was brought about in part by a reex-
amination of the Ninth Circuit’s landmark 2009 case LVRC Holdings LLC v. 
Brekka.48 The case is typically thought of as a hallmark case for the “narrow” 
view of the CFAA — and in in the scraping world it was, at first.49 But starting 
in 2013 courts began to look to other language in Brekka to develop a new 
“revocation” theory under the CFAA, where a website could establish liability 
if it could show that at some point the site “revoked” access to the scraper, and 
the scraper continued to access the site.50 And instead of carefully examining 
the language of a restriction or looking solely to technical controls, courts al-
lowed claims based on mechanisms that arguably “revoked” access, and thus 
reintroduced  CFAA claims hinging on less-concrete factors, such as the con-
tents of a website terms of use, a direct demand to stop access a public website, 
a scraper’s implied knowledge of third-party contracts, and even the use of a 
technical block without any notice or other communication to the scraper.51 In 
light of this shift, prior resistance to applying the CFAA as a means of  enforc-
ing restrictions on “use” of content was irrelevant; so long as a website could 
show that it acted upon its objections by completely revoking the scraping par-
ty’s access, the site could invoke the CFAA.52 
 
 47 This is especially true given some courts’ careful analysis of whether a purported “ac-
cess restriction” is just a “use restriction” in disguise. See, Wentworth-Douglass Hosp. v. 
Young & Novis Prof. Ass’n, No. 10-cv-120-SM, 2012 WL 2522963, at *4 (D.N.H. June 29, 
2012) (“[D]enominating limitations as ‘access restrictions’ does not convert what is other-
wise a use policy into an access restriction”). 
 48 581 F.3d 1127. See infra notes 210–218 and accompanying text. 
 49 See Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 2d 927, 933 (E.D. Va. 2010) (citing 
Brekka as supporting the district’s earlier decision to limit claims based on use restrictions 
instead of access restrictions); Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. C 08-05780 JW, 
2010 WL 3291750, at *9 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2010) (citing Brekka specifically to find that 
“more recent CFAA cases militate for an interpretation [of the California CFAA equivalent] 
that does not premise permission to access or use a computer or computer network on a vio-
lation of terms of use”). 
 50 This started with Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (N.D. Cal. 2013), 
and reached highest prominence with Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058 
(9th Cir. 2016). 
 51 See infra notes 234–235 and accompanying text. 
 52 Craigslist, 964 F. Supp. 2d at 1185 (finding the fact that a website brought an action 
against a scraper because of how the scraper used the information obtained to be “true, but 
beside the point”). 
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Most recently, spurred in part by the same policy concerns that led courts to 
initially constrain the CFAA in the first place,53 courts have begun rethinking 
this result. Three opinions issued in the past few months54 have begun to reject 
this broader reading, either by finding a different rule for public websites or by 
more strictly defining what constitutes “revocation.”55 These opinions either do 
not address the “revocation” theory or purport to fit their analysis into the 
“revocation” line of cases identified above, but in a way that would seem to 
make it far more difficult to stop a scraper from accessing a website available 
to the general public, even if told to stop by the website in question. To the 
most recent court to address the question, scraping “is merely a technological 
advance that makes information collection easier,” and if human user can col-
lect information on the Internet, a scraper can, too.56 
In sum, there is a pattern as to how courts have approached application of 
the CFAA to web scraping. There has been a subtle evolution in thinking that 
has worked its way into the two decades of CFAA case law, albeit one that that 
has at various times given differing levels of clarity to scrapers who seek to 
understand whether their activity violates this law. The conclusion of this piece 
identifies broader questions about the CFAA and web scraping which courts 
must address in order to bring more harmony and comprehension to this area 
of law. Those questions include how to deal with conflicting instructions on 
authorization coming from different channels on the same website; how the 
analysis should interact with the existing technical protocols that regulate web 
scraping, including the Robots Exclusion Standard; and, beyond the interests 
of the website host, what other factors should govern application of the CFAA 
to unwanted web scraping of public websites.  
II. REFINING THE TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF INTERNET SCRAPING 
At the outset, it is worth taking some time to more precisely define what is 
meant by “web scraping.” Courts have struggled to settle on a common termi-
nology for web scraping, let alone what types of activity should meet the defi-
nition.57 They have used terms ranging from “scraping programs,”58 “screen 
 
 53 See, hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1110–11 (N.D. Cal. 
2017). 
 54 Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini Street, Inc., 879 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2018); Sandvig v. Ses-
sions, No. 16-cv-1638 (JDB), 2018 WL 1568881 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2018); hiQ Labs, 273 F. 
Supp. 3d. 1099. 
 55 See infra Section III.D. 
 56 Sandvig, 2018 WL 156881 at *7. 
 57 See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1060 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 2000) 
(“Programs that recursively query other computers over the Internet in order to obtain a sig-
nificant amount of information are referred to in the pleadings by various names, including 
software robots, robots, spiders and web crawlers.”). 
 58 CouponCabin LLC v. Savings.com, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-39-TLS, 2016 WL 3181826, at 
*1 (N.D. Ind. June 8, 2016). 
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scraping,”59 “a robot web crawling program,”60 or use of a “robot,”61 “automat-
ic web browser,”62 “webcrawlers,”63 “spider,”64 or, confusingly, a “search en-
gine.”65 Some courts attempt to differentiate between these terms based on 
how many websites are targeted,66 how much is copied,67 or by different steps 
in the process of data extraction.68 Those who scrape have been viewed as any-
thing from a vital public benefactor69 to, in the colorful words of one objecting 
party, “a low lying snake belly scum sucking rat” who should be “quartered 
and hung.”70 
Analogies and metaphors permeate the opinions as well, though they seem 
to generate more confusion than they remedy.71 Websites are often likened by 
litigants and courts to stores,72 though sometimes instead a bank,73 a fruit 
 
 59 Dream Marriage Grp., Inc. v. Anastasia Int’l, Inc., No. CV 10-5034 RSWL (FFMX), 
2012 WL 3024227, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2012). 
 60 QVC, Inc. v. Resultly, LLC, 159 F. Supp. 3d 576, 589 (E.D. Pa. 2016). 
 61 EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 579 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 62 Internet Archive v. Shell, 505 F. Supp. 2d 755, 760 (D. Colo. 2007). 
 63 Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. 99CV7654, 2000 WL 1887522, at *2 
(C.D. Cal. 2000). 
 64 Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV997654HLHBKX, 2003 WL 
21406289, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003). 
 65 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1155 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Google 
operates a search engine, a software program that automatically accesses thousands of web-
sites[.]”). 
 66 EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 579 (1st Cir. 2001) (distin-
guishing between “robots,” which “gather information for countless purposes” across many 
websites, and a “scraper” who is “focused solely on [plaintiff’s] website”). 
 67 See Hirschey, supra note 40, at 898 (noting that search engines are usually referred to 
as “crawlers,” while more invasive retrieval tools are called “scrapers.”). 
 68 Compulife Software, Inc. v. Newman, No. 9:16-CV-81942-
ROSENBERG/BRANNON, 2017 WL 2537357, at *4 (S.D. Fla. June 12, 2017) (referring to 
scraping as inserting data into scraper’s database); CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, 
Inc., No. 10-3542, 2012 WL 5269213, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2012) (noting that download-
ed .pdf files have to be “converted and processed before being copied as text, or ‘scraped,’ 
into [defendant’s] database”). 
 69 A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 638 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 70 Tamburo v. Dworkin, 974 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1210 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
 71 Some courts make a conscious point to distance themselves from such analogies. Unit-
ed States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 541 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[W]e must remain mindful 
that cybercrimes do not happen in some metaphysical location . . . . People and computers 
still exist in identifiable places in the physical world.”); Fidlar Techs. v. LPS Real Estate 
Data Sols., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 844, 855–56 (C.D. Ill. 2015) (criticizing one litigant’s theo-
ry of a computer system as “almost metaphysical in its abstraction”). 
 72 See, e.g., Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1187 (N.D. Cal. 2013); 
eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2000). This analo-
gy finds its way into scholarship as well. See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpret-
ing “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 
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stand,74 a food truck,75 or a bulletin board.76 Scrapers have in turn been likened 
to an invading army of robots,77 a vandal taking hammer to a piece of machin-
ery,78 a person walking into a bank with both a safety deposit key and a shot-
gun79 — or, more innocently, a roving machine that constantly takes photo-
graphs,80 an interviewer using an audio recording instead of taking notes,81 or a 
person who records signs posted within a store.82 It is hard to see what guiding 
principles one can draw from such an array of conflicting imagery. 
The Southern District of New York appears to have been the first court to 
define a web scraper in 1996, as “software capable of automatically contacting 
various Web sites and extracting relevant information.”83 This definition has an 
elegant structure, but upon closer examination becomes over-inclusive. After 
all, web browsers like Firefox or Chrome are also capable of automatically 
contacting websites to extract information. The process of loading a modern 
website necessarily requires the browser to contact the numerous additional 
other servers that host the underlying images, banner ads, social media buttons, 
tracking pixels, and other objects.84 More recently browsers have also begun 
“link prefetching,” or loading pages that are linked off of the page that the user 
most recently loaded.85 Both link-prefetching and the modern web browser 
functionality explained above could theoretically fall under the Southern Dis-
trict’s definition, but it is highly unlikely that most lawyers or coders would 
consider them to be “web scraping.”   
 
1620 (2003) (“[W]e could say that visiting a publicly accessible website is something like 
visiting an open store in the physical world.”) [hereinafter Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope]. 
 73 Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 74 Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 401 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 75 Sandvig v. Sessions, No. 16-cv-1638 (JDB), 2018 WL 1568881 at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 
2018). 
 76 Facebook, Inc. v. ConnectU LLC, 489 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
 77 eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1065. The court, to its credit, said that “[t]his analogy, while 
graphic, appears inappropriate.” Id. 
 78 Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. 99CV7654, 2000 WL 1887522, at *4 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000) (order denying preliminary injunction). 
 79 Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 80 Healthcare Advocates, Inc. v. Harding, Earley, Follmer & Frailey, 497 F. Supp. 2d 
627, 631 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 81 Sandvig, 2018 WL 1568881 at *7. 
 82 hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1112–13 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
 83 Shea ex rel. The Am. Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (dis-
cussing early search engines). 
 84 MITCHELL, supra note 11, at 5; see infra notes 103–104 and accompanying text. 
 85 Perhaps significantly, this is usually done with explicit instructions written into in the 
HTML by the website host. See Addy Osmani, Preload, Prefetch, and Priorities in Chrome, 
MEDIUM (Mar. 27, 2017), https://medium.com/reloading/preload-prefetch-and-priorities-in-
chrome-776165961bbf [https://perma.cc/Q8SW-U9M4]. 
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A more detailed definition comes from the First Circuit in the 2003 scraping 
case EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp.: 
A scraper, also called a “robot” or “bot,” is nothing more than a computer 
program that accesses information contained in a succession of webpages 
stored on the accessed computer. Strictly speaking, the accessed infor-
mation is not the graphical interface seen by the user but rather the 
HTML source code — available to anyone who views the site — that 
generates the graphical interface. This information is then downloaded to 
the user’s computer.86 
This definition draws closer to the mark, but overlooks some details. First, 
many applications of scraping don’t require the retrieval of a succession of 
pages on the same computer. They could instead look to follow links around to 
other websites hosted on other computers.87 Second, material on most modern 
websites is rarely statically “stored” on pages, patiently waiting to be “extract-
ed” by a scraper. Most websites instead are dynamically generated as they are 
requested, often drawing upon information provided by the user seeking ac-
cess, including the user’s account information, time of day, geographic loca-
tion, and whether the user is accessing the page from a mobile device.88 In-
deed, one application of web scraping is to provide insight into how these 
inputs can change the outputs. For example, one recent research project looked 
at how prices for online products varied based on the user’s location by vary-
ing the reported zip code of the scraper to see whether the retailer provided dif-
fering prices for the same products (as indeed they did).89 
On a broader level, courts can also run astray if they start their analysis at 
what a human sees at the web browser level and work from there to get to the 
data that scrapers extract,90 or imagine the scraper as an automaton replicating 
the steps of a human at a faster rate.91 This approach can make it seem as 
 
 86 318 F.3d 58, 60 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 87 HEMENWAY & CALISHAIN, supra note 37, at 150–51. 
 88 See GOURLEY & TOTTY, supra note 37 at 4–5. 
 89 Katja Seim & Michael Sinkinson, Mixed Pricing in Online Marketplaces, 14 QUANT. 
MARKETING & ECON. 129, 131 (2016). 
 90 See Nautical Sols. Mktg., Inc. v. Boats.com, No. 8:02–CV–760–T–23TGW, 2004 WL 
783121, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 1, 2004) (a scraper “visits targeted public websites, extracts 
facts from the websites and indexes the extracted facts . . . .”); Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tick-
ets.com, Inc., No. CV997654HLHVBKX, 2003 WL 21406289, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 
2003) (“The ‘spider’ ‘crawled’ through the internal web pages . . . and electronically ex-
tracted the electronic information from which the web page is shown on the user’s comput-
er.”). 
 91 See, e.g., In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 575 F.3d 279, 288 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(defining crawlers as “sophisticated automated web-scanning software . . . that aggressively 
catalogues and indexes website content”); Snap-On Bus. Sols., Inc. v. O’Neil & Assocs., 
Inc., 708 F. Supp. 2d 669, 674 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (quoting from defendant’s testimony, de-
scribing scraping as “simulat[ing] what a user could do interactively with the website by 
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though a website scraper is an elaborate layer on top of a web browser, perhaps 
adding more of a burden on the website or going deeper than a normal web 
browser could. Most scrapers operate instead on a simpler level, and retrieve 
the objects and files used to build a visible webpage before they are rendered 
and displayed to the user.92 
The confusion here could stem from the layer of Internet architecture on 
which courts tend to focus their analyses. As has long been observed in the 
field of Internet design, the structure of the Internet resembles a layered hour-
glass, with different layers representing different aspects of network and com-
munications architecture, a principal genius of the Internet’s architecture being 
the fact that, in the words of Prof. Jonathan Zittrain, “[t]inkerers can work on 
one layer without having to understand much about the others, and there need 
not be any coordination or relationship between those working at one layer and 
those at another.”93 
Near the top of this hourglass are the layers that an average computer user 
thinks about, things like web browsers and the Hypertext Markup Language 
(HTML) code that creates a webpage.94 One layer down from this is the Hy-
pertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), which is the layer at which most web scrap-
ers operate.95 HTTP is the protocol by which all traffic on the World Wide 
Web is formatted for communication,96 and addresses how all media, pages, 
scripts, and other files (referred to generally as “web resources”) are created, 
stored, and retrieved on web servers.97 The protocol defines the roles of a 
“server,” or the computer generating and hosting web resources, and a “client,” 
the requester of web resources.98 The protocol also defines the commands a 
client can use to request information from a server — including GET, to re-
 
pointing and clicking, only it’s automated, and, therefore, able to point, click and do other 
things that the user would do in an automated manner, making it able to run unattended in a 
much more efficient way”); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Terri Welles, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 
1092 (S.D. Cal. 1999), rev’d, 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Web crawlers ‘read’ individual 
web pages by reading much of the text in the HTML source code and store in cyberspace 
memory the text they find on each page.”). 
 92 GOURLEY & TOTTY, supra note 37, at 8–9. There are some web scrapers that are de-
signed instead to operate on top of a standard web browser. See, e.g., WEBSCRAPER, 
http://webscraper.io/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2018) [https://perma.cc/2W4V-5B8W] (a browser 
extension for the Chrome browser to enable web scraping). 
 93 JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET (AND HOW TO STOP IT) 68 (2008). 
 94 I am being a bit loose with defining the layers because, as Zittrain notes, “[t]he exact 
number of layers varies depending on who is drawing the hourglass and why . . . .” Id. at 67. 
 95 MITCHELL, supra note 11, at 178–80 (noting various ways scrapers can tinker with set-
tings at the HTTP layer to achieve different results). 
 96 GOURLEY & TOTTY, supra note 37, at 3. 
 97 Id. at 4. 
 98 Id. To be slightly more specific, when generating content, a server may also act as a 
“gateway,” converting HTTP traffic into another protocol for another computer to process 
and respond to. See id. at 19. 
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trieve a particular resource; POST, to send client data to a server application; 
and HEAD, to send just the metadata (the “HTTP headers”) around a particular 
resource from the server to the client.99 
Programs used by clients to retrieve web resources from servers are known 
as “user agents.”100 A web browser is one form of user agent. A scraper is an-
other. Either way, a standard communication between a server and a user agent 
will start with the agent making a request to the server for particular infor-
mation, including the method of communication (usually GET), the address of 
the requested information, and various “headers” that may contain additional 
information relevant to the request, such as the requester’s operating system, 
Internet Protocol (IP) address, or the address of the website the agent came 
from.101 The server will take that information and use it to formulate an appro-
priate response, and then send the requested data.102 So when loading a 
webpage in a web browser the user agent (in that case, a web browser) sends 
an HTTP request to the server to obtain the HTML file that sets forth the con-
tent and layout of the webpage. It then issues multiple additional HTTP trans-
actions with the same server (and likely other servers) to build the various oth-
er elements that constitute the web page’s contents: a banner ad here, an 
embedded social media post there, and so forth.103 Users rarely notice this hap-
pening, but some web browsers allow you to log these transactions to see this 
cascade play out.104 
At this layer a scraper works in the same way a web browser does.105 It 
sends out HTTP transactions for the web resources that it seeks along the same 
protocols, and the server sends the same files in return.106 The scraper’s level 
 
 99 Id. at 8–9. Courts occasionally find their way to discussing the various HTTP headers 
in the context of different cases. See Fidlar Techs. v. LPS Real Estate Data Sols., Inc., 810 
F.3d 1075, 1077–78 (7th Cir. 2016) (in a scraping case, examining systematic “SOAP” or 
“Simple Object Access Protocol” requests made using the POST method); see also, In re 
Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 16 (1st Cir. 2003) (privacy concerns related to sending infor-
mation using the GET method, versus the POST method); Level 3 Comm’ns, LLC v. Lime-
light Networks, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 664, 674–75 (E.D. Va. 2008) (a patent Markman opin-
ion concerning competing techniques for extracting information from HTTP headers). 
 100 GOURLEY & TOTTY, supra note 37, at 19–20. 
 101 Id. at 258–59. 
 102 Id. at 69. 
 103 Id. at 9. 
 104 Josh Gough, How to Spy on Your Browser’s HTTP Requests and Responses!, 
VERSIONONE BLOG (Feb. 7, 2013), https://blog.versionone.com/spy-on-browser-http-
requests/ [https://perma.cc/Q239-4JQX]. 
 105 Though courts do not always appreciate that this is the case. See, e.g., Compulife 
Software, Inc. v. Newman, No. 9:16-CV-81942-ROSENBERG/BRANNON, 2017 WL 
2537357, at *3 (S.D. Fla. June 12, 2017) (referring to “get commands” as “an alternative 
way to communicate with the host-based software without going through a website,” when, 
in fact, a web browser would also send GET requests to load a webpage). 
 106 GOURLEY & TOTTY, supra note 37, at 19–20. 
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of access is just as deep as a web browser’s, and the method by which it makes 
its queries is identical.107 The principal difference between a scraper and a 
normal web browser is that the material presented is not rendered and present-
ed to the user; it is instead used for some other purpose. This can mean that as 
to any given web page the load placed on the host’s server may in fact be 
lighter, because the scraper may only need one web resource, rather than the 
dozens a web-browser might need, in order to extract the relevant infor-
mation.108 And while it is not required, web scrapers can include a “user agent 
header” in their requests, identifying the name of their scraper.109 HTTP even 
allows the scraper operators to provide an email address in case a server’s ad-
ministrator wishes to contact them.110 
Perhaps the largest difference between browsing and scraping is that, where 
browsing allows a user to “collect” the assorted contents of a particular 
webpage, most scrapers will collect information from a series of different 
webpages.111 Indeed, the challenge in developing an effective scraper is to un-
derstand where and how the data in question is built and stored, so one can 
write a scraping program that will retrieve the greatest amount of desired in-
formation and the least amount of noise.112 Also, because scrapers often re-
quest pages serially, a misconfigured scraper can get caught up into accidental 
“loops” and “dups” based on how the server responds to the scraper’s re-
quest.113 In those situations scrapers risk overwhelming a website and crashing 
it, and programmers have developed an array of techniques to help prevent 
this.114 After all, a website scraper generally does not want the site to crash; it 
wants to access the site’s contents.115 
Properly contextualized, therefore, the access a server provides to a web 
scraper is highly similar to that provided to a standard web browser. The 
scraper requests and receives files using the same protocols as a web browser, 
 
 107 Other legal scholars have observed this fact as well. Davik, supra note 40, at 332; 
Maureen O’Rourke, Property Rights and Competition on the Internet: In Search of an Ap-
propriate Analogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 561, 570 (2001). 
 108 MITCHELL, supra note 11, at viii–ix. 
 109 See United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 530 (3d Cir. 2014) (defendant altered 
the user agent on the web browser in order to match what the server expected when deliver-
ing content); QVC, Inc. v. Resultly, LLC, 99 F. Supp. 3d 525, 530 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (noting 
that defendant scraper identified itself in its user agent header, even though “[t]here is no 
requirement that [defendant] identify itself in this way”); GOURLEY & TOTTY, supra note 37, 
at 225. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 215. 
 112 Id. at 223–24 (outlining strategies to that end). 
 113 Id. at 217–18. 
 114 See, e.g., HEMENWAY & CALISHAIN, supra note 37, at 42–45. 
 115 See, e.g., QVC, Inc. v. Resultly, LLC, 159 F. Supp. 3d 576, 594 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (not-
ing that it was implausible to claim that scraper intended to cause damage under the Com-
puter Fraud and Abuse Act, as defendant relied on website to operate its business). 
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and at least in some cases, places less of a load on a website by only retrieving 
the objects necessary to extract certain information, rather than all of the mate-
rial to visually render a website for a human reader. The difference between a 
scraper and a web browser comes less from differences in how scrapers access 
servers, and more from what the scraper does with the information after it is 
loaded. To return to the CFAA, to the extent the statute targets those who ac-
cess websites without permission,116 it would seem as though web scraping 
should rarely pose an issue under the statute — at most, particular uses of 
scraped material could be examined by other doctrines that police the use of 
information, such as copyright law.117 That has not been the experience of web 
scraping under the CFAA, however, as detailed below. 
III. PHASES OF THINKING ON WEB SCRAPING AND THE CFAA 
There have been about sixty-one opinions that have considered the applica-
tion of the CFAA (or state equivalents thereof) to web scraping.118 About thir-
ty-nine of these opinions go beyond procedural questions and other ancillary 
issues to directly analyze the substantive claims.119 The opinions begin in 
2000, a little less than a decade after the establishment of HTTP and the World 
Wide Web in 1991,120 and grow in frequency nearly every year since, from one 
 
 116 This would be akin to the “trespass” formulation that Prof. Orin Kerr and others have 
put forth as a guiding framework. See Orin Kerr, Norms of Computer Trespass, 116 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1143 (2016) [hereinafter Kerr, Norms]. 
 117 As indeed they have. See, e.g., Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 
F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding copyright infringement based on a scrape); Field 
v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006) (finding fair use based on a scrape). 
 118 Claims related to web scraping have been raised under several states’ computer access 
laws. See Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini St., Inc., 879 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2018) (California and 
Nevada); Fidlar v. LPS Real Estate Data Sols., Inc., 810 F.3d 1075 (7th Cir. 2016) (Illinois); 
DHI Grp., Inc. v. Kent, No. H-16-1670, 2017 WL 4837730 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2017) (Tex-
as); United States v. Auernheimer, No. 11-cr-470 (SDW), 2012 WL 5389142 (D.N.J. Oct. 
26, 2012), rev’d on other grounds, 748 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 2014) (New Jersey); Earthcam, 
Inc. v. Oxblue Corp., No. 1:11-cv-02278-WSD, 2012 WL 12836518 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 
2012) (Georgia); Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 2d 927 (E.D. Va. 2010) (Vir-
ginia). Except as otherwise noted, most courts analyze questions of website authorization 
under a similar framework under both federal and state computer access laws, and cases that 
raised state equivalents are analyzed as part of the set of opinions discussed here. 
 119 See infra notes 159, 191, 231. 
 120 See, The Original HTTP as Defined in 1991, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM (1991), 
https://www.w3.org/Protocols/HTTP/AsImplemented.html. There are some older precedents 
to this analysis, including cases that examined scraping-like activity in the context of com-
panies sending spam emails on the America Online and CompuServe platforms. See, e.g., 
Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Va. 1998); CompuServe Inc. v. 
Cyber Promotions, 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997). The most famous form of web 
scraper, the search engine, was also mentioned in earlier cases that considered the constitu-
tional challenges to the Communications Decency Act, Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 
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to two opinions per year in the early 2000s121 to closer to six to eight per year 
in the 2010s.122 This roughly tracks the expansion of the CFAA in the civil 
context more broadly.123 There have been a little over a dozen appellate opin-
ions in cases involving web scraping,124 but only one has generated something 
resembling a dissenting opinion.125 
Before turning to the particular analyses, there are observations to make 
about the set as a whole. First, it is important to note that of the sixty-one opin-
ions identified, about a third stem from just four underlying disputes: a decade-
long litigation between Facebook and would-be social network aggregator 
Power.com;126 parallel litigation in California and Pennsylvania between two 
rival services that assist college students who transfer schools;127 a series of 
claims brought by a scraper of dog pedigree databases against data hosts who 
 
929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Shea ex rel. The Am. Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), and cases addressing trademark law and search indexes, Nettis Envtl. Ltd. 
v. IWI, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 722, 727–28 (N.D. Ohio 1999); Insituform Techs., Inc. v. Nat’l 
Envirotech Grp., L.L.C, No. 97-2064, 1997 WL 34658315, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 26, 1997); 
Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Akkaoui, No. C 96-3381 CW, 1996 WL 772709, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 
29, 1996). 
 121 See supra note 43. 
 122 See id. 
 123 Jonathan Mayer, Cybercrime Litigation, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1453, 1476 (2016). 
 124 Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini St., Inc., 879 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2018); EarthCam, Inc. v. 
OxBlue Corp., 703 Fed. App’x 803 (11th Cir. 2017); Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, 
Inc., 828 F.3d 1068, superseded by, 844 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2016); Fidlar Techs. v. LPS 
Real Estate Data Sols., Inc., 810 F.3d 1075 (7th Cir. 2016); CollegeSource, Inc. v. Acade-
myOne, Inc., 597 Fed. App’x 116 (3d Cir. 2015); United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 
525 (3d Cir. 2014); VRCompliance LLC v. HomeAway, Inc., 715 F.3d 570 (4th Cir. 2013); 
CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2011); Snapt Inc. v. El-
lipse Commc’ns, Inc., 430 Fed. App’x 346 (5th Cir. 2011); Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 
693 (7th Cir. 2010); A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 
2009); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004); EF Cultural Travel 
BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2003); EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 
274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 125 Judge Fred I. Parker of the Second Circuit was initially assigned to write the majority 
opinion in Register.com, Inc., 356 F.3d at 395 n.1. In the process of doing so, he changed 
his mind on the result, but was unable to convince Judges Leval and Keenan to join a brief 
that would have reversed the preliminary injunction against the scraper in question. Id. 
Judge Parker passed away before drafting a formal dissent, and the court appended a draft of 
his would-be majority opinion reversing the injunction to their decision upholding the in-
junction. See id. at 406. In the end, the court did not use the CFAA as grounds to issue the 
injunction, id., and Judge Parker would have vacated the injunction on both the CFAA and 
other grounds, id. at 440. 
 126 Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 3d 765 (N.D. Cal. 2017); see su-
pra note 43. 
 127 CollegeSource, 597 F. App’x 116; see supra note 43. 
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called him a criminal and thief;128 and litigation between two rival security 
camera companies with entangled trade secrets issues.129 This high concentra-
tion of opinions in a few specific cases could mean that the facts of those cas-
es, and the courts deciding them, stand to have an outsized influence in our un-
derstanding of the doctrine to date. 
Second, a tremendous number of these opinions concern claims brought by 
direct commercial competitors130 or companies in closely adjacent markets to 
each other.131 A far smaller number involve commercial scrapers with non-
commercial hosts.132 Only three opinions involve a commercial data host and a 
public-interest-oriented scraper: a declaratory action brought by an association 
of resort towns who used a scraping service to determine whether home rentals 
facilitated on an online platform were evading tax obligations;133 a hacker who 
discovered a security oversight in AT&T’s website for iPad users, who then 
gathered a list of email addresses leaked through this oversight and gave the 
list to the online publication Gawker;134 and a constitutional challenge to the 
 
 128 These cases also contribute very little in the way of analysis, as the CFAA claim was 
largely ancillary to other issues. Tamburo, 974 F. Supp. 2d 1199; see supra note 43. 
 129 EarthCam, 703 F. App’x 803; see supra note 43. 
 130 See, e.g., EarthCam, 703 Fed. App’x 803; EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 
274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001); Snap-On Bus. Sols., Inc. v. O’Neil & Assocs., Inc., 708 F. 
Supp. 2d 669 (N.D. Ohio 2010). 
 131 See, e.g., Power Ventures, 252 F. Supp. 3d 765; QVC, Inc. v. Resultly, LLC, 99 F. 
Supp. 2d 525 (E.D. Pa. 2015); Craigslist, Inc. v. 3Taps, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962 (N.D. Cal. 
2013). 
 132 See, e.g., Tamburo, 974 F. Supp. 2d 1199. In A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, 
LLC, the scraper in question was a commercial plagiarism detection software that was al-
leged to have scraped websites to build its comparative corpus, but the plaintiff in that par-
ticular case submitted material voluntarily, and the counterclaims at issue involved that 
plaintiff’s use a third-party account to access the scraper’s services. 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 
2009). 
 133 VRCompliance LLC v. HomeAway, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-1088, 2011 WL 6779320, at 
*1 (E.D. Va. Dec. 27, 2011). The case was decided on procedural grounds. Id. at *5–6. 
 134 United States v. Auernheimer, No. 11-cr-470, 2012 WL 5389142, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 
26, 2012), rev’d on other grounds, 748 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 2014) (scraping AT&T’s website 
to reveal a data vulnerability and disclosing the fruits of this to an online publication). In the 
interest of full disclosure, I co-authored an amicus brief in this case in support of the de-
fendant. See Brief for Digital Media Law Project as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant-
Appellant, United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-1816). While 
perhaps motivated by a sense of public interest, the defendant in question is as far from 
morally praiseworthy, a self-proclaimed neo-Nazi who operates one of the largest platforms 
for white supremacists on the Internet. Rachel Gutman, Who Is Weev, and Why Did He De-
rail a Journalist’s Career?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 14, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/02/who-is-weev/553295/ 
[https://perma.cc/LF3X-TZAH]. 
SELLARS - MACROED 8.6.18.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/11/18  11:38 AM 
2018] TWENTY YEARS OF WEB SCRAPING AND THE CFAA 391 
 
CFAA brought by a number of plaintiffs who engaged in scraping as part of 
their academic and journalistic pursuits.135  
It is unclear what precisely accounts for this concentration of cases in the 
commercial arena. The text of the CFAA generally does not draw distinctions 
based on the purpose for which one accesses a computer without authoriza-
tion.136 Rather than any distinction in the statute, the prevalence of commercial 
suits may reflect a belief among website owners that commercially competitive 
scrapers are the only ones that cause harm worthy of the expense of a lawsuit. 
Web hosts might also be hesitant to pursue scrapers that have a public interest 
motivation, for fear of public backlash or unfavorable judicial precedent. 
Claims against scrapers tend to be brought under the “obtaining infor-
mation” provisions in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C)137 and the “computer fraud” 
provisions in § 1030(a)(4),138 though a few also address the “damage” provi-
sions in § 1030(a)(5).139 Under the “obtaining information” provisions, one vi-
olates the CFAA when one “intentionally accesses a computer without authori-
zation or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains [. . .] information 
from any protected computer.”140 One violates the “computer fraud” provision 
when one “knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected comput-
er without authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such 
conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value,” with the 
caveat that the “thing of value” cannot be the use of the computer itself, unless 
such use is worth more than $5000 in a one-year period.141 
Both provisions require a plaintiff or prosecutor to first show that a user ac-
cessed a computer “without authorization” or “exceed[ed] authorized ac-
cess.”142 How precisely to interpret these phrases has been at the center of a 
 
 135 Sandvig v. Sessions, No. 16-cv-1638 (JDB), 2018 WL 1568881 at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 
2018). 
 136 Though one could argue that an “intent to defraud,” as required in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1030(a)(4) (2012), implies a certain degree of commerciality or at least pecuniary transfer 
that may not be met in some cases. See United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1074–75 
(1st Cir. 1997). A commercial purpose can also escalate sentencing of crimes under 
§§ 1030(a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(6). See id. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(i). 
 137 It does not appear as though any case has applied the similar provisions in 
§§ 1030(a)(2)(A) and (B), which protect records from financial institutions and information 
from federal departments and agencies. 
 138 See, e.g., Fidlar Techs., Inc. v. LPS Real Estate Data Sols., Inc., 810 F.3d 1075 (7th 
Cir. 2016). 
 139 See, e.g., QVC, Inc. v. Resultly, LLC, 99 F. Supp. 3d 525 (E.D. Pa. 2015). 
 140 § 1030(a)(2)(C). Under the most recent definition, a “protected computer” extends to 
any computer “which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.” Id. 
§ 1030(e)(2)(B). 
 141 Id. § 1030(a)(4). 
 142 The statute does not define “authorization,” but defines “exceeds authorized access” 
recursively. Id. § 1030(e)(6) (“[T]he term ‘exceeds authorized access’ means to access a 
computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the 
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very large portion of the discussion about the CFAA143 and is a main focus of 
this piece as well.  
Scholars have endeavored to taxonomize the types of mechanisms that 
courts reference when analyzing questions of authorization. In a landmark 
work from 2003, Prof. Orin Kerr divided decisions addressing the CFAA’s 
“authorization” question into three categories.144 First, he identified decisions 
that looked to  the “intended function” of the technology  used to gain “access” 
to the computer in question — drawing principally from the 1991 Second Cir-
cuit CFAA case United States v. Morris, a case that concerned a computer sci-
ence student who sent a self-replicating worm through exploits of protocols on 
the early Internet.145 This test looks to find a particular technological tool that a 
defendant used to access a computer and then see whether the defendant used 
the tool either in accordance with its designed purpose or in a way that it is 
otherwise popularly employed.146 As Kerr observes, the “intended function” 
test is a blended consideration of the computer’s code-based mechanisms of 
access and the social norms surrounding the use thereof.147  
Second, he identified cases that find a lack of authorization due to the mis-
conduct of parties who may owe a duty to the computer’s owner, such as an 
employee on a work computer.148 As Kerr notes, this is a “strikingly broad” 
definition of unauthorized access, as it would find felonious conduct “whenev-
er an employee uses a computer for reasons contrary to an employer’s inter-
est.”149 Third, Kerr identifies a series of cases finding that defendant’s breach 
of an agreement governing their use of the computer in question rendered their 
access “unauthorized” under the CFAA.150  
 
computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter[.]”). The damage provisions 
under the CFAA use a slightly different phrasing, and punish those who access “without 
authorization” only, or “cause[] damage without authorization.” Id. § 1030(a)(5). 
 143 See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, A Code-Based Approach to Unauthorized Access Under 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1442 (2016); Kerr, Norms, su-
pra note 116; Michael J. Madison, Authority and Authors and Codes, 84 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1616 (2016); Matthew Gordon, A Hybrid Approach to Analyzing Authorization in the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 357 (2015); Cyrus Y. Chung, 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: How Computer Science Can Help with the Problem of 
Overbreadth, 24 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 233 (2010). 
 144 Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope, supra note 73, at 1628-32. 
 145 Id. at 1629–30 (citing United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 146 Id. at 1630. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. at 1633 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. at 1637–40. After laying out this framework, Kerr argues that only access circum-
venting code-based restrictions, such as the restrictions at issue in Morris, should be a valid 
basis for CFAA claims. See Id. at 1643-45. He supports this proposal with a number of ar-
guments, including his assertion that “limiting the scope of computer misuse statutes to the 
circumvention of code-based restrictions would let criminal law advance two vitally im-
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More recently, in a piece from 2016, Professor Patricia Bellia identified five 
different “interpretive paradigms” courts use to assess authorization under the 
CFAA.151 First is the “agency paradigm,” which is largely similar to Kerr’s 
employee misconduct paradigm above.152 Second is what Bellia calls the 
“norms-of-access paradigm,” which she cites as the method adopted by the Se-
cond Circuit in the Morris decision, taking this decision out of the blended 
code- and norms-based category that Kerr placed the case in above, and casting 
the case instead as one where the “court developed a concept of authorized ac-
cess based on its understanding of how one ought to use the technology in 
question”153 Bellia breaks more contractual cases into two categories: a “policy 
paradigm” to encompass authorization based on terms of use and other unilat-
eral statements by computer owners,154 and a “contract paradigm” that looks 
more specifically at whether a fully-formed contract existed between the user 
and the computer owner.155 Finally, Bellia notes that, while no never fully 
adopted in an appellate decision, some courts have suggested use of a purely 
code-based paradigm.156  
As shown in the sections that follow, courts at different times have looked to 
different types of mechanisms in web scraping cases. For ease of discussion, I 
roughly categorize the restrictions in question as being code-based, contract-
based, or based on a normative understanding. 
A. The 2000s: Anything Can Inform Authorization 
In the first decade of web scraping cases, courts embraced virtually all of the 
theories of authorization set out above. It seemed in this period that any mech-
anism could be used to determine that the scraper’s access was unauthorized 
and therefore in violation of the statute. From the turn of the millennium157 un-
 
portant and often conflicting goals of Internet regulation: first, to allow Internet users to en-
joy as much freedom as possible to do as they wish online, and, second, to protect the priva-
cy and security of Internet users and their data.” Id. at 1649. 
 151 Bellia, supra note 144, at 1445. 
 152 Id. at 1446–47. 
 153 Id. at 1449. 
 154 Id. at 1451-55 
 155 Id. at 1455-56. 
 156 Id. at 1457–60. Bellia, like Kerr, has argued for a drive towards a code-based interpre-
tation of authorization. Id. at 1476. 
 157 The CFAA made an appearance in some of the earliest cases on the lawfulness of web 
scraping, including the now-famous eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 
(N.D. Cal. 2000). The court in that case focused its analysis solely on the trespass to chattels 
doctrine. Bidder’s Edge’s usual analytic companion, Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, 
Inc., also confined its scraping analysis to trespass to chattels doctrine. No. 99-CV-7654 
HLH(BQRX), 2000 WL 525390 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000). The first case to actually ana-
lyze CFAA liability appears to be Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
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til courts began to shift their analysis in 2009,158 there appear to be nine opin-
ions that discuss liability under the CFAA for web scrapers, resulting in pre-
liminary injunctions in a handful of cases and denied motions to dismiss in a 
couple of others.159 While these cases leave some ambiguity based on their 
procedural posture, these early opinions appeared to suggest that virtually any 
signal of a website’s displeasure about a scraper is sufficient to put the scraper 
on notice that subsequent access would be “unauthorized.” Courts found, for 
example, that the violation of a restriction on the use of information could ret-
roactively make the scraper’s access unauthorized,160 as could breaching a term 
of service,161 or accessing a public website after receiving express warnings to 
stay away.162 In one case, the court found that the filing of the complaint in the 
case itself served to signal that subsequent access was unauthorized, thus giv-
ing grounds for a preliminary injunction in the very same case.163 Two cases 
from this period suggested that use of a third-party user account with permis-
sion of the account holder but without permission of the website could form 
 
 158 I draw this line specifically at the decision of the non-scraping case LVRC Holdings 
LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009), for reasons discussed in Section III.B. be-
low. 
 159 The cases analyzed are, in chronological order, Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 
F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d on other grounds, 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004) (al-
lowing preliminary injunction against scraper); EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 
274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001) (allowing preliminary injunction against scraper); EF Cultural 
Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2003) (suggesting under the same facts as 
Explorica, Inc. that the scraper themselves would not be enjoined); Sw. Airlines Co. v. 
Farechase, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 435 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (motion to dismiss brought by scrap-
er denied); Facebook, Inc. v. ConnectU LLC, 489 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (mo-
tion to dismiss for California CFAA equivalent brought by scraper denied); Healthcare Ad-
vocates, Inc. v. Harding, Early, Follmer & Frailey, 497 F. Supp. 2d 627 (E.D. Pa. 2007) 
(summary judgment in favor of scraper); Ticketmaster LLC v. RMG Techs., Inc., 507 F. 
Supp. 2d 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (preliminary injunction issued against scraper, but not on 
CFAA grounds); A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Va. 2008), rev’d sub 
nom., A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009) (in an unu-
sual posture, counterclaim brought by the scraper against a party objecting to other aspects 
of scraper’s activity initially denied on summary judgment, then reversed on appeal). While 
not indexed in either of the major online case databases, the District of Massachusetts deci-
sion that was appealed in the Explorica, Inc. and Zefer Corp. cases also granted a prelimi-
nary injunction against the scraper. See Explorica Inc., 274 F.3d at 580. 
 160 Id. at 583–84; Register.com, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 251 (“[B]oth Verio’s method of ac-
cessing the WHOIS data and Verio’s end uses of the data violate the CFAA.”). 
 161 Farechase, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 439 (terms of use banned “any deep-link, page-scrape, 
robot, spider or other automatic device, program, algorithm or methodology which does the 
same things”). 
 162 Id.  at 439-40. 
 163 Register.com, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 249 (“[I]t is clear since at least the date this lawsuit 
was filed that Register.com does not consent to Verio’s use of a search robot[.]”). 
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the basis of access without authorization, but neither squarely addressed the 
claim.164 This was, to put it simply, a very uncertain time for web scrapers.165 
Three opinions sided in favor of the scraper during this time. One court de-
nied a preliminary injunction on the grounds that the website host failed to fac-
tually substantiate its claims.166 The other two based their decision on the ab-
sence of any authorization mechanism at all167 — though each also suggested 
that a well-deployed terms of use notice on the website may have changed their 
analysis.168 The would-be dissent from the late Judge Fred I. Parker in the Se-
cond Circuit’s Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc. decision also indicated that it 
would have found in favor of the scraper on a CFAA claim, as the website 
failed to show the requisite harm to bring a civil action.169 Given the limited 
room by which the scraper escaped liability in each case, it is hard to find 
grounds to believe that these courts were making their decisions based on a 
narrow reading of the CFAA. Each case instead seemed one minor factor away 
from finding liability. 
Perhaps the only positive indication for scrapers in this time came in the 
form of dicta in the First Circuit’s decision in EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer 
Corp., which suggested that there may come a point where public policy would 
prevent a court from finding CFAA liability based on contractual restrictions 
 
 164 iParadigms, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 479, 486 (use of a username and password found 
on the Internet may be unauthorized, but court found a lack of sufficient loss to meet the 
civil action threshold, the Fourth Circuit reversing on this point but not addressing the mer-
its); ConnectU, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 1091 (examining the California CFAA equivalent, and 
finding that even if use of a third-party account may be permitted access, the subsequent 
copying of information with authorization likely violated the statute). 
 165 This state of affairs was referenced later in Tamburo v. Dworkin, when the court had to 
analyze whether a statement that data scraped off a website was “stolen” could be grounds 
for a defamation claim. The court found it was protected opinion in part because of how un-
settled the law around web scraping was in 2004, when the statement was made. Tamburo v. 
Dworkin, 974 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1215–16 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
 166 Ticketmaster LLC v. RMG Techs., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
The court did, however, indicate that it would find that the scraper accessed the website 
without authorization, and enjoined the scraper on other grounds. 
 167 EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 2003); Healthcare Ad-
vocates, Inc. v. Harding, Earley, Follmer & Frailey, 497 F. Supp. 2d 627, 649 (E.D. Pa. 
2007). Healthcare Advocates is an especially unusual scraping case, as it concerns the ar-
chival copies of websites made by the Internet Archive which, as it happens, retroactively 
applies the Robots Exclusion Standard to previously-archived material. The court stressed 
that its analysis of access questions was closely tailored to these unique facts. Id. at 643. 
 168 Zefer, 318 F.3d at 63 (“If EF wants to ban scrapers, let it say so on the webpage or a 
link clearly marked as containing restrictions”); Healthcare Advocates, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 
649 (distinguishing Farechase, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 435, on the grounds that in that case 
“the defendant had agreed not to scrape the information,” an agreement done through terms 
of service in that case). 
 169 Register.com, Inc., 356 F.3d at 439–40 (Opinion of Parker, J.). For the history of this 
opinion and its unusual format, see the discussion in supra note 125. 
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on a public website.170 In support of this point, the First Circuit cited a pair of 
cases concerning undercover journalism, where prior courts had limited dam-
ages and rejected some claims based on trespass and breaches of duties on the 
part of the journalists posing as customers or low-level employees, out of a 
free speech concern.171 This idea would resurface again in the most recent set 
of cases on web scraping,172 but first courts would have to narrow in, and then 
expand out, interpretation of the CFAA through the intervening decade and a 
half. 
B. The Early 2010s: A Narrower Reading, and a Lean Toward 
Technology 
The next round of opinions concerning web scraping and the CFAA —
 starting in 2009 and continuing until 2013 — signaled a slight trend towards 
limiting the law’s application. This follows a pattern in the CFAA cases more 
generally, where (to use popular terminology173) the earlier decisions that 
found “broad” reasons to find access without authorization under the CFAA174 
began to give way to courts adopting a “narrow” view on unauthorized ac-
cess.175 
To unpack this further, courts who narrow the CFAA appear to do so along 
two major lines: looking explicitly to technical controls instead of controls set 
by contract or principles of duty,176 and policing against the application of 
mere “use restrictions” (as opposed to “access restrictions”) to govern unau-
thorized access under the CFAA.177 While other circuits have now joined this 
trend,178 two Ninth Circuit opinions served as an early catalyst: LVRC Hold-
 
 170 318 F.3d at 63. 
 171 Id. at 63 (citing Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Citites/ABC Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 
1999); Desnick v. ABC, 44 F.3d 1345, 1351 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
 172 See infra Section III.D. 
 173 See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 123. 
 174 See, e.g., Int’l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 175 See, e.g., United States v. Nosal (Nosal I), 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 176 See, e.g., Adv. Micro Devices, Inc. v. Feldstein, 951 F. Supp. 2d 212, 217 (D. Mass. 
2013) (noting, and adopting, a narrow interpretation that “reflects a technological model of 
authorization, whereby the scope of authorized access is defined by the technologically im-
plemented barriers that circumscribe that access”). The Fourth Circuit has also hinted at this 
interpretation. WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 207 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(finding no unauthorized access when the defendant had access on a technical level). 
 177 Nosal I, 676 F.3d at 863–64; Wentworth-Douglass Hosp. v. Young & Novis Prof. 
Ass’n, No. 10-cv-120-SM, 2012 WL 2522963, at *4 (D.N.H. June 29, 2012). This differen-
tiation appears in some cases several years before the decisions discussed here. See Int’l As-
soc. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d 479, 499 (D. 
Md. 2005) (“[The CFAA does] not prohibit the unauthorized disclosure or use of infor-
mation, but rather unauthorized access.”). 
 178 See, e.g., United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 528 (2d Cir. 2015); WEC, 687 F.3d at 
206. 
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ings LLC v. Brekka in 2009179 and the en banc decision in United States v. 
Nosal (Nosal I) in 2012.180 Brekka concerned a lawsuit brought by an employer 
against a former employee, Christopher Brekka, who, while still employed, 
sent emails from his work computer to a personal computer.181 The employer 
argued that Brekka accessed his work computer without authorization because 
he sent the information on his work computer “to further his own personal in-
terests, rather than the interests of LVRC.”182 The court rejected this duty-
based theory of authorization, finding that because Brekka had permission to 
both use the computer and access the documents in question he did not violate 
the CFAA.183 
In Nosal I, the en banc Ninth Circuit considered a similar set of facts involv-
ing an employee at an executive recruiting firm who, after he left, convinced 
his (then still-employed) former coworkers to send him customer information, 
which would allow him to launch a rival business.184 The employer argued that 
the employees’ access to the customer database was “unauthorized” because 
use of the database for anything other than official business violated their em-
ployment contract.185 The court found that such “use” restrictions were im-
proper grounds for liability under the CFAA.186 Although the case did not in-
volve access to public websites, the court suggested in dicta that its reasoning 
would also bar claims based on violations of restrictions memorialized in web-
sites’ terms of use.187 Further, nearly all of the court’s examples of actions that 
would be unauthorized access were more akin to what most would call “hack-
ing,” or circumvention of code-based controls to a computer, though the court 
did not go so far as to explicitly require this.188 
 
 179 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 180 Nosal I, 676 F.3d 854. 
 181 Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1129–30. 
 182 Id. at 1132. The plaintiff claimed both that the access was without authorization and 
exceeded authorized access, and the court interpreted the two the same way. Id. at 1135 n.7. 
 183 Id. at 1135. 
 184 676 F.3d at 856 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. at 863–64. 
 187 Id. at 860–61. 
 188 See id. at 858 (noting that an employee who “circumvents the security measures” on a 
system would exceed authorized access); id. (suggesting that access “without authorization” 
would apply to “outside hackers,” and “exceeds authorized access” would apply to “inside 
hackers”); id. at 863 (stating that the purpose of the CFAA is to punish “the circumvention 
of technological access barriers”); but see id. at 857 (“[A]ssume an employee is permitted to 
access only product information on the company’s computer but accesses customer data: He 
would ‘exceed[] authorized access if he looks at the customer lists.”). The court also uses 
the example of an employee who uses another’s login credentials, which could be argued as 
a technical control or not. See id. at 858. That said, courts in the Ninth Circuit following 
Nosal I were careful not to expressly adopt a strictly-code-based theory of authorization. 
See, e.g., Weingand v. Harland Fin. Sols., Inc., No. C-11-3109 EMC, 2012 WL 2327660, at 
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This trend away from finding liability based on mere “use restrictions” and 
toward examination of technological forms of authorization should, at least in 
theory, allow for greater tolerance of web scraping. After all, as noted in Sec-
tion II, a web scraper covers no more ground than a web browser itself, and so 
the technical access which allows a person to view a website, should likewise 
grant someone the ability to scrape the same files.189 Furthermore, the most 
common form of contractual restriction on scraping, a website’s terms of use, 
usually only impart “use restrictions” — that is, they allow you to access the 
site and merely place restrictions on what you can do with the information af-
ter you arrive.190 Both the lean towards code-based mechanisms of authoriza-
tion and the policing against finding CFAA liability based on “use” restrictions 
would be strong steps toward protection of web scrapers. 
And indeed, scraping cases from this period seem to take some tentative 
steps toward this narrowing. There are twelve substantive opinions on web 
scraping and the CFAA issued between the decision in Brekka and the August 
2013 opinion in Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., which changed how courts ana-
lyze scraping, as further discussed in Section III.C.191 The period saw five cas-
 
*3 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2012). For a fuller discussion of the interpretation of Nosal I and 
whether it allows an exclusively code-based claim of unauthorized access, see Mayer, The 
“Narrow” Interpretation, supra note 45. 
 189 See supra notes 105–107 and accompanying text. 
 190 Even if written in the form of a condition of access, courts have policed against at-
tempts to convert use restrictions into access restrictions in order to make a claim under the 
CFAA. Wentworth-Douglass Hosp. v. Young & Novis Prof’l Ass’n, No. 10-CV-120-SM, 
2012 WL 2522963, at *4 (D.N.H. June 29, 2012). Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc. makes this 
point as well, but then turns the argument on its head, as described in Section III.C. below. 
Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc, 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1184–85 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 191 They are, in chronological order, Snap-On Bus. Sols., Inc. v. O’Neil & Assocs., 706 F. 
Supp. 2d 669 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (scraper’s summary judgment motion denied); Facebook, 
Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. C 08-05780 JW, 2010 WL 3291750 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 
2010) (cross-motions for summary judgment denied); Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini St., Inc., 
No. 2:10-CV-00106-LRH-PAL, 2010 WL 3257933 (D. Nev. Aug. 13, 2010) (scraper’s mo-
tion to dismiss denied); Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 2d 927 (E.D. Va. 2010) 
(scraper’s motion to dismiss granted); Snapt Inc. v. Ellipse Commc’ns Inc., No. 3:09-CV-
0661-O, 2010 WL 11542004 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2010) (summary judgment for putative 
scraper); Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(summary judgment against scraper); EarthCam, Inc. v. Oxblue Corp., No. 1:11-cv-02278-
WSD, 2012 WL 12836518 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 2012) (scraper’s motion to dismiss denied in 
part); CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., No. 10-3542, 2012 WL 5269213 (E.D. Pa. 
Oct. 25, 2012) (summary judgment for scraper); United States v. Auernheimer, No. 11-cr-
470 (SDW), 2012 WL 5389142 (D.N.J. Oct. 26, 2012) (denying motion to dismiss indict-
ment); Citizens Info. Assocs. v. Justmugshots.com, No. 1-12-CV-573-LY, 2013 WL 
12076563 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2013) (scraper’s motion to dismiss granted); Craigslist Inc. 
v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (scraper’s motion to dismiss denied); 
EarthCam, Inc. v. Oxblue Corp., No. 1:11-cv-2278-WSD, 2013 WL 11904713 (N.D. Ga. 
July 19, 2013) (scraper’s motion to dismiss granted in relevant part). While not a scraping 
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es where claims against scrapers were either adjudicated in the scraper’s favor 
or dismissed.192 Two of the opinions rejected use of a website terms of service 
to inform a CFAA claim.193 The opinions at first read a bit like those from the 
earlier period, as in both cases the courts focus on the lack of a validly-formed 
contract to make the terms binding. Each case, however, goes one step further, 
and emphasizes the public nature of the content in question as an additional 
reason for finding a lack of CFAA liability.194 No similar argument can be 
found in the cases from the earlier period. (The three other cases from this pe-
riod are decided on fact-specific grounds: failure to prove that a scraper actual-
ly accessed the host’s computer,195 failure to show the requisite level of loss to 
bring a civil action,196 and failure to bring a timely claim.197) 
And even the cases that do find “unauthorized” access reflect a narrowed 
approach to the statute. For example, the 2010 decision by the Northern Dis-
trict of California in Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc. considered Pow-
er.com’s use of third-party Facebook accounts (with the account holder’s per-
mission) to scrape user data in order to build a social media aggregation 
service.198 While allowing a claim under California’s CFAA analogue to pro-
ceed, the court found that use of Facebook terms of use to determine authoriza-
tion would “create a constitutionally untenable situation in which criminal 
penalties could be meted out on the basis of violating vague or ambiguous 
terms of use.” The court held that in order to prove its claim, Facebook needed 
 
case, a similar discussion can be found in Koch Indus., Inc. v. Does, No. 2:10CV1275DAK, 
2011 WL 1775765 at *8 (D. Utah May 9, 2011). 
 192 EarthCam, Inc., 2013 WL 11904713, at *5; Citizens Info. Assocs., 2013 WL 12076563 
at *4; CollegeSource, 2012 WL 5269213, at *23; Snapt, 2010 WL 11542004, at *6; Cvent, 
739 F. Supp. 2d at 927. The decision in Snapt was also affirmed with little elaboration dur-
ing this time, Snapt Inc. v. Ellipse Commc’ns. Inc., 430 F. App’x 346 (5th Cir. 2011), and 
the decision in CollegeSource Inc. was similarly affirmed a few years later. CollegeSource, 
Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 597 F. App’x 116 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 193 CollegeSource, 2012 WL 5269213, at *14 (“[B]ecause AcademyOne was under no 
obligation to abide by any terms of use as to the CataLink acess, it did not exceed authorized 
access.”); Cvent, 739 F. Supp. 2d at 933 (“Cvent’s website, including its CSN database, is 
therefore not protected in any meaningful fashion by its Terms of Use or otherwise.”). 
 194 See CollegeSource, 2012 WL 5269213, at *14 (citing Brekka, then noting that “the 
record does not reflect any evidence of a breach of security or ‘hacking’ by AcademyOne” 
and that the information in question “is available on the Internet and does not require a 
password or individualized access”); Cvent Inc., 739 F. Supp. 2d at 933 (distinguishing this 
case from earlier cases in part because “the entire world was given unimpeded access to 
Cvent’s website”). 
 195 Snapt, 2010 WL 11542004, at *2. 
 196 Citizens Info. Assocs., 2013 WL 12076563, at *3–4. 
 197 EarthCam, 2013 WL 11904713, at *5. The case did allow other claims to proceed on 
separate grounds. 
 198 The factual background of the case can be found at Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, 
Inc., No. C 08-5780 JF (RS), 2009 WL 1299698, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2009). 
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to show that Power Ventures accessed Facebook “in a manner that overcomes 
technical or code-based barriers.”199 Two years later, the court granted sum-
mary judgment for Facebook on this point, after the website showed that Pow-
er Ventures circumvented technical barriers by designing its system to deliber-
ately evade Internet Protocol (IP) address blocks put in place by Facebook.200 
(On appeal the Ninth Circuit adopted a very different analysis, as discussed be-
low.)201 
In addition to this case, two others considered whether the scraper’s use of a 
third-party’s website account could form the basis of CFAA liability. As Kerr 
recently noted, characterizing the analysis of these third-party-account cases as 
code-based versus contract-based can be difficult, as they tend to include ele-
ments of both paradigms.202 The court in Power Ventures focused on the code-
based elements of the scraper’s access, whereas the other two cases in this pe-
riod focused instead on the contract between the third-party user and the plat-
form. In one, the Northern District of Ohio denied a scraper’s motion for sum-
mary judgment, finding that the authorization at issue turned on disputed terms 
in the agreement between the website host and its user.203 In the other, an early 
decision in the long-running Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini Street, Inc. case, the 
court denied a motion to dismiss with little analysis, but specifically noted that 
the third-party user breached its license with the website by allowing the 
scraper to access the site.204 
The one criminal scraping case from this period defied this narrowing trend, 
and explicitly rejected a code-based limitation to the CFAA, though the case 
was reversed on different grounds on appeal.205 And while the case never re-
 
 199 Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. C 08-05780 JW, 2010 WL 3291750, at 
*11 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2010). This is also quite similar to the analysis initially undertaken 
in the court in 3Taps, before pivoting to the expanded analysis discussed below. Craigslist 
Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 968–69 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 200 Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2012), 
aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 844 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 201 See infra notes 242–245 and accompanying text. 
 202 See Kerr, Norms, supra note 116, at 1174. 
 203 Snap-On Bus. Sols., Inc. v. O’Neil & Assocs., Inc., 708 F. Supp. 2d 669, 678 (N.D. 
Ohio 2010). The case resulted in a verdict against the scraper, though in a follow-on case 
involving the defendant’s insurer, the owner of the account in question, a subsidiary of 
Mitsubishi, still maintained that it was the lawful owner of the data held by the website host 
and should have had authority to grant the scraper access in this way. Axis Surplus Ins. Co. 
v. Mitsubishi Caterpillar Forklift Am., Inc., No. H-11-3745, 2012 WL 1788171, at *4 (S.D. 
Tex. May 16, 2012). 
 204 No. 2:10-CV-00106-LRH-PAL, 2010 WL 3257933, at *3 (D. Nev. Aug. 13, 2010). 
The Ninth Circuit ultimately found that the restrictions in Oracle’s agreement with its users 
cannot form the basis of a claim under California or Nevada’s CFAA equivalents. See Ora-
cle USA, Inc. v. Rimini St., Inc., 879 F.3d 948, 962 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 205 United States v. Auernheimer, No. 11-CR-470 (SDW), 2012 WL 5389142, at *3 n.1 
(D.N.J. Oct. 26, 2012). 
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sulted in an opinion on point, the question of how technology should inform 
CFAA cases was a topic of debate following what was likely the most famous 
scraping case of this time, the prosecution of Aaron Swartz.  Swartz was a 
Harvard researcher who scraped the contents of the JSTOR academic article 
database for a still-unknown project.206 After Swartz’s death, members of 
Congress introduced (and re-introduced) a bill entitled “Aaron’s Law,” which 
would categorically prohibit interpretations of CFAA authorization based on 
violations of terms of use.207 Scholars at the time debated whether such a law 
would have actually helped Swartz in that case, or whether the technological 
controls at issue, such his evasion of IP and media access control address 
(MAC address) filters, could still be used to find liability.208 
In sum, scrapers in this period still found themselves facing potential liabil-
ity, but had new theories at their disposal to rebut such claims, such as argu-
ments that a mechanism in question was a mere “use restriction,” or that the 
mechanisms setting authorization should be more code-based to have legal ef-
fect. Subsequent cases could have then turned to the finer questions around the 
CFAA as applied to common web design mechanisms and controls, and looked 
in detail at user accounts, IP address blocking, or MAC address filters. But in-
stead, courts picked up a new concept for interpreting authorization, and in so 
doing, brought their decisions closer in line to the first decade of web scraping 
litigation, where nearly any mechanism could be used to demonstrate that a 
scraper’s access was “unauthorized.” 
C. The Mid 2010s: Brekka’s “Revocation” Backdoor 
The narrowing trend of the early 2010s was cut short soon after its adoption. 
More recently, courts seized upon some of the extraneous language in Brek-
ka,209 and used it to turn the analysis of that case inside out. Instead of focusing 
 
 206 I analyzed the CFAA application to the case at some length shortly after his death. 
Andy Sellars, The Impact of “Aaron’s Law” on Aaron Swartz’s Case, DIGITAL MEDIA L. 
PROJECT (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.dmlp.org/blog/2013/impact-aarons-law-aaron-swartzs-
case [https://perma.cc/9NMF-R6RY]. With the benefit of hindsight, the emphasis I placed 
on code-based barriers setting authorization after Nosal I has not been as strong as I thought 
it would be at the time, given the cases discussed in Section III.C. 
 207 H.R. 1918, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 2454, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 208 See Sellars, supra note 206. 
 209 While the language in question is prominent, there is good reason to consider it dicta. 
It certainly is not dispositive; under the specific holding in Brekka, the court found that the 
defendant had authorization to access the computer during the relevant time period, and the 
facts did not show that he accessed it after his employment terminated. LVRC Holdings 
LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 2009). At several times throughout the 
opinion, though, the Ninth Circuit opined as to whether such subsequent access would have 
violated the CFAA, if shown. See id. at 1135 (“Rather, we hold that a person uses a comput-
er ‘without authorization’ under §§ 1030(a)(2) and (4) when the person has not received 
permission to use the computer for any purpose . . . or when the employer has rescinded 
permission to access the computer and the defendant uses the computer anyway.”); see also 
SELLARS - MACROED 8.6.18.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/11/18  11:38 AM 
402 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. [Vol. 24:372 
 
on the distinction between “access” and “use” described above, these cases in-
stead seize upon dicta in which the Ninth Circuit speculates about what might 
be “unauthorized access” under a different set of facts: when the computer 
owner “has rescinded permission to access the computer and the defendant us-
es the computer anyway.”210 
A series of cases, including some web scraping cases, focused on this “revo-
cation” theory to develop two different heuristics for evaluating authorization, 
depending on whether one accesses the computer “without authorization” or 
whether one “exceeds authorized access.”211 This trend began with the scrap-
ing case Craigslist, Inc. v. 3Taps Inc.,212 and reached its apex with a pair of 
Ninth Circuit cases from 2016: a revisit to United States v. Nosal (Nosal II) 
and the Power Ventures cases discussed above. The cases pull the CFAA doc-
trine in two distinct directions. On the one hand, when examining cases 
brought under a claim that the defendant “exceed[ed] authorized access” they 
keep the narrowing and technologically-leaning construction from Brekka and 
Nosal I.  But at the same time, they radically broaden what could constitute ac-
cess “without authorization,” covering any situation in which a mechanism 
signaling that there was a revocation of access can be identified — be it tech-
nological or not, use-based or access-based.213 Courts in this period also found 
defendants to have exceeded authorized access where “revocation” signals 
conflicted with other authorization mechanisms, such as a cease-and-desist let-
ters sent to stop someone from accessing a website freely available as a tech-
nical matter.214 
 
id. at 1136 (“There is no dispute that if Brekka accessed LVRC’s information on the LOAD 
website after he left the company in September 2003, Brekka would have access the pro-
tected computer “without authorization” for purposes of the CFAA.”). 
 210 Id. at 1135 (emphasis added). 
 211 United States v. Nosal (Nosal II), 844 F.3d 1024, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing the 
dicta from Brekka, and confining cases like Nosal I as cases concerning the “exceeds au-
thorized access” prong exclusively); Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 
1066-67 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding a total bar to access to an essentially-public website 
“[o]nce permission has been revoked,” citing Brekka, and limiting Nosal I to merely saying 
that terms of use violations, alone, cannot form the basis of liability). This is in some ways 
the inverse to the First Circuit’s approach in its first web scraping case, which seemed to 
signal that it may confine the more technically-leaning “intended function” test from United 
States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991), to cases where a person accessed “without 
authorization” only. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 582 n.10 (1st 
Cir. 2001). 
 212 Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1185 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 213 Nosal II, 844 F.3d at 1033; Power Ventures, 844 F.3d at 1066–67. 
 214 Eriq Gardner, Can Hillary Clinton Be Barred from Visiting DonaldJTrump.com?, 
HOLLYWOOD REP. (July 13, 2016), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/can-hillary-
clinton-be-barred-910326 [https://perma.cc/9B46-NSL2] (discussing the potential extended 
limits of Power Ventures). Interestingly, the court in Power Ventures explicitly retreated 
from a purely code-based version of authorization when considering revocation of access, 
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One can trace this change based solely on the citations to Brekka itself. Prior 
to the pivot in the 3Taps opinion, two scraping cases cited Brekka to argue for 
a limitation in CFAA liability,215 and three cases cited Brekka for unrelated 
reasons.216 Of 3Taps and the cases that followed, no case cites Brekka to argue 
for a narrow reading. Instead, five opinions cite Brekka to support a broad 
“revocation” theory,217 and one cites Brekka for an unrelated reason.218 
Interestingly, 3Taps itself adopted this reworked interpretation of Brekka 
only after an earlier opinion in the same case cast doubt on use of the CFAA to 
challenge access to “information generally available” on a public website.219 
3Taps involved claims by the online classified ads website Craigslist against a 
series of services that helped aggregate and visualize Craigslist listings.220 To 
prove that the services’ access was unauthorized, Craigslist pointed to its terms 
of use, cease-and-desist letters it sent to the services, and IP blocks it im-
posed.221 The court’s initial opinion reads much like those from the CFAA era 
discussed in Section III.B. above: it rejected use of terms of service to govern 
authorization, citing Nosal I and noting that the terms of use contained “only 
‘use’ restrictions, not true ‘access’ restrictions,”222 and allowed the claim to 
 
finding that IP blocking, alone, should not form the basis of such a finding. Power Ventures, 
844 F.3d at 1068 n.5. 
 215 Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 2d 927, 933 (E.D. Va. 2010) (citing Brek-
ka as supporting the district’s slightly-earlier decision to limit claims based on use re-
strictions instead of access restrictions); Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. C 08-
05780 JW, 2010 WL 3291750, at *9 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2010) (citing Brekka to specifically 
to find that “more recent CFAA cases militate for an interpretation [of the California CFAA 
equivalent] that does not premise permission to access or use a computer or computer net-
work on a violation of terms of use”). 
 216 United States v. Auernheimer, No. 11-cr-470 (SDW), 2012 WL 5389142, at *2 (D.N.J. 
Oct. 26, 2012) (citing Brekka to note that courts usually use the “ordinary meaning” of 
terms “without authorization”); CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., No. 10-3542, 
2012 WL 5269213 at *13 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2012) (citing Brekka for the general definition 
of “exceeds authorized access”); Snap-On Bus. Sols., Inc. v. O’Neil & Assocs., Inc., 708 F. 
Supp. 2d 669, 677 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (noting generally that Brekka supports the “narrow def-
inition” of unauthorized access). 
 217 Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1066–67 (9th Cir. 2016); Cou-
ponCabin LLC v. Savings.com, Inc., No. 2:14-CV-39-TLS, 2017 WL 83337, at *3 (N.D. 
Ind. Jan. 10, 2017); CouponCabin LLC v. Savings.com, Inc., No. 2:14-CV-39-TLS, 2016 
WL 3181826, at *4 (N.D. Ind. June 8, 2016); QVC, Inc. v. Resultly, LLC, 159 F. Supp. 3d 
576, 595 (E.D. Pa. 2016); 3Taps, 964 F. Supp. 2d at 1183. 
 218 Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini St., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1142, rev’d, 879 F.3d 948 
(9th Cir. 2018) (stating that courts construe the computer access statutes strictly). 
 219 Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 969–70 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 220 Id. at 966. 
 221 Id. at 969. 
 222 The court also found that web crawlers were not explicitly prohibited under the terms 
of use. See id. n.6. 
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proceed based on the IP block instead.223  In passing, however, the court sug-
gested that it might even find an even more narrow application of the CFAA to 
web scraping, raising what it called “a threshold question of whether the 
CFAA applies where the owner of an otherwise publicly accessible website 
takes steps to restrict access by specific entities, such as the owner’s competi-
tors.”224 
After the court accepted additional briefing on the issue and revisited the 
question, it changed its tune considerably.225 The court answered its “threshold 
question” emphatically in favor of the CFAA’s application to all of these cir-
cumstances, citing Brekka to observe that “computer owners have the power to 
revoke the authorizations they grant,”226 and found that Craigslist “affirmative-
ly communicated its decision to revoke” through its letter and IP-address 
blocks.227 The court rejected concerns raised by the scrapers, citing Nosal I, 
that applying the CFAA to “use policies ‘that most people are only dimly 
aware of and virtually no one reads or understands’ . . . presents serious notice 
concerns and also threatens to ‘transform whole categories of otherwise innoc-
uous behavior into federal crimes.’”228 The court found no notice concern here, 
because “[t]he notice issue becomes limited to how clearly the website owner 
communicates the banning,” and in this case “Craigslist affirmatively commu-
nicated its decision” through these mechanisms.229 That Craigslist only at-
tempted to block access to the site because it disagreed with how someone was 
using otherwise-lawfully obtained data was irrelevant; all that mattered was 
that Craigslist sought to ban one particular visitor to its public website, and that 
visitor was on notice of that ban.230  
Through this recasting of the CFAA analysis, the court once again opened 
the door to a wide array of authorization mechanisms that previously had been 
narrowed away. Six out of a total of fifteen substantive opinions from this pe-
riod deny scrapers’ motions to dismiss.231 Rather than looking to code-based 
 
 223 See id. at 969–70. The court does foreshadow the case’s later focus on the cease-and-
desist letter, which the court specifically notes in passing prohibited access to the site “for 
any purposes.” Id. at 969. 
 224 Id. n.8. 
 225 Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 226 Id. at 1183 (citing LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
 227 Id. at 1184. 
 228 Id. (quoting United States v. Nosal (Nosal I), 676 F.3d 854, 860–61 (9th Cir. 2012)). 
 229 Id. 
 230 See id. at 1185 (“That [Craigslist] did so because of how 3Taps used Craigslist’s in-
formation is true, but beside the point”). 
 231 The full list of cases are, in chronological order, Id. (denying scraper’s motion to dis-
miss based on revocation of access); Fidlar Techs. v. LPS Real Estate Data Sols., No. 13-cv-
4021, 2013 WL 5973938 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2013) (denying motion to dismiss); EarthCam, 
Inc. v. Oxblue Corp., 49 F. Supp. 3d 1210 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (summary judgment in favor of 
scraper); CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 597 Fed. App’x 116 (3d Cir. 2015) (af-
firming summary judgment in favor of scraper); Fidlar Techs. v. LPS Real Estate Data Sols., 
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mechanisms of authorization or carefully parsing “access restrictions” versus 
“use restrictions,” courts found CFAA violations based on mechanisms like a 
website telling the scraper their access is revoked,232 or even the contents of a 
terms-of-service agreement.233 With the focus placed on “revocation,” ques-
tions about the legal impact of technical controls like user accounts or IP and 
MAC address filtering all fell away in favor of an analysis which asked wheth-
er the website owner used a technical control to signal a revocation of access, 
and whether the user understood this signal.234 One case went as far as to find 
that the act of an IP-address block alone, without any additional communica-
tion, served as effective notice of revocation of access.235 Such an analysis not 
only overlooks the finer questions around whether circumvention of an IP ad-
dress block should be grounds for a federal felony, it puts every Internet user 
who ever confronted a “down” website in a curious moment of legal risk. The 
 
82 F. Supp. 3d 844 (C.D. Ill. 2015) (summary judgment in favor of scraper); QVC, Inc. v. 
Resultly, LLC, 99 F. Supp. 3d 525 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (denying preliminary injunction against 
scraper); Fidlar Techs. v. LPS Real Estate Data Solutions, 810 F.3d 1075 (7th Cir. 2016) 
(affirming summary judgment in favor of scraper); QVC, Inc. v. Resultly, LLC, 159 F. 
Supp. 3d 576 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (denying scraper’s motion to dismiss, noting revocation of 
access); CouponCabin LLC v. Savings.com, Inc., No. 14-cv-39, 2016 WL 3181826 (N.D. 
Ind. June 8, 2016) (same); Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini St., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (D. 
Nev. 2016), rev’d in relevant part 879 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2018) (declining scraper’s motion 
for judgment as a matter of law, based on a revocation theory); Facebook, Inc. v. Power 
Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2016) (affirming summary judgment against scraper 
based on a revocation theory); CouponCabin LLC v. Savings.com, Inc., No. 14-cv-39, 2017 
WL 83337 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 10, 2017) (denying scraper’s motion for judgment on the plead-
ings, based on revocation of access); Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 
3d 765 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (re-affirming Ninth Circuit result against scraper, and determining 
damages); EarthCam, Inc. v. OxBlue Corp., 703 Fed. App’x 803 (11th Cir. 2017) (affirming 
summary judgment in favor of scraper); DHI Group, Inc. v. Kent, No. 16-cv-1670, 2017 
WL 4837730 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2017) (denying scraper’s motion to dismiss). 
 232 See CouponCabin LLC, 2016 WL 3181826, at *4. The case notes that the plaintiff also 
tried to impose security measures to block access. See id. at *1. 
 233 See DHI Grp., 2017 WL 4837730, at *4; QVC, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 597 (“[J]ust as a 
cease-and-desist letter would put a publisher on notice that its actions were prohibited, 
VigLink’s Terms of Service . . . put Resultly on notice that QVC prohibited web-crawling”). 
Some decisions adopt non-revocation reasons for denying a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., 
Fidlar Techs., 2013 WL 5973938, at *7 n.7 (rejecting an argument that plaintiff failed to 
show adequate loss for a civil CFAA claim). 
 234 See, e.g., Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1184 (N.D. Cal. 2013) 
(“Craigslist affirmatively communicated its decision to revoke 3Taps’ access through 
its . . . IP blocking efforts.”); id. at 1186 n.7 (“IP blocking . . . is a real barrier, and a clear 
signal from the computer owner to the person”). 
 235 See CouponCabin LLC, 2017 WL 83337, at *3 (as to one party who did not receive a 
direct communication, “[r]evocation of website access would have been sufficient to give 
the Defendants constructive notice that they were without authorization to act as they alleg-
edly did”). 
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website might be down due to a server error or technical bug with the user’s 
ISP. It might instead be due to a site-imposed block — in which case the next 
attempt to load the page is grounds for CFAA liability.236 The “refresh” button 
was never meant to hold such legal weight. 
The extremity of this approach is perhaps best illustrated in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania’s opinion in QVC, Inc. v. Resultly, LLC.237 The court in 
that case denied a motion to dismiss on a CFAA claim because the scraper Re-
sultly had accepted a terms-of-service agreement with a third-party promotion-
al-services partner named VigLink, which required Resultly to “comply with 
all rules, regulations and guidelines, as well as any applicable . . . terms and 
conditions and policies” provided by merchants affiliated with VigLink’s ser-
vice.238 VigLink in turn had entered into two agreements with the merchant 
QVC, which placed limits on what sources of information VigLink could use 
in its operations. 239 The court found that QVC’s restriction on sources of in-
formation would extend to web-crawling, and let the chain of contracts back to 
Resultly inform a CFAA claim against Resultly by QVC.240 It takes the con-
tractual due diligence of an M&A attorney to sort out potential liability under 
this framework. 
Three opinions in two cases went beyond early-stage litigation and actually 
assigned or upheld liability on this revocation theory — though one case was 
later reversed on appeal, as discussed in Section III.D. below.241 The most 
noteworthy of this group is the appeal in Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, 
Inc. While the lower court decision offered an example of a more technologi-
cally leaning CFAA analysis, on appeal the Ninth Circuit dispensed with tech-
nical issues and instead found CFAA liability based on Power Ventures con-
tinued access after having received a cease-and-desist letter from Facebook.242 
The court also found a curiously mixed role for Facebook’s terms of use. On 
the one hand, the court noted that Power Ventures was not subject to the terms 
of use as it was not itself a Facebook user.243 But at the same time, the court 
seemed to approve of the substance of the cease-and-desist letter, which re-
voked access because Power allegedly breached Facebook’s terms, a contract 
 
 236 The CFAA punishes attempted access without authorization as well. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1030(b). 
 237 159 F. Supp. 3d 576 (E.D. Pa. 2016). 
 238 Id. at 584–85. 
 239 Id. at 581–82. 
 240 Id. at 597. 
 241 Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2016), on remand, 
252 F. Supp. 3d 765 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini St., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 2d 
1134 (D. Nev. 2016), rev’d, 879 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 242 Power Ventures, 844 F.3d at 1068 n.5 (“[B]ypassing an IP address, without more, 
would not constitute unauthorized use”). 
 243 See id. at 1069 (“Facebook and Power had no direct relationship, and it does not ap-
pear that Power was subject to any contractual terms that it could have breached”). 
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to which they were not a party.244 The court squares these two findings by not-
ing that “in addition to asserting a violation of Facebook’s terms of use, the 
cease and desist letter warned Power that it may have violated federal and state 
law.”245 But this just completes a logical circle, creating the unusual situation 
where a declaration that the law was broken made it so.  
Five opinions in three cases found in favor of the scraper during this time 
period, though their analyses also feel a bit more like those from the first dec-
ade of web-scraping litigation.246 One opinion found for the scraper on the 
grounds that the parties had not formed a valid contract over access to this par-
ticular data.247 A second looked to the contract between the parties to analyze 
the CFAA claim and found that the contract did not prohibit the activity in 
question.248 One case involved the use of a third-party account with the ac-
count holder’s permission, which as noted above, always presents a somewhat 
hybrid technological and contractual analysis.249 Here, though, the analysis fol-
lowed the contract to find that the website by its terms did not prohibit sharing 
in this way, and also cast doubt on whether the defendant was even aware of 
the contract in the first place.250 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed this decision on 
the grounds that the evidence was “too attenuated” to show that the scraper 
knew of the contract in question.251 Other scrapers who faced liability under 
the “fraud” provisions of § 1030(a)(4) or the “intentional damage” provisions 
of § 1030(a)(5)(A) prevailed on the plaintiff’s failure to substantiate the addi-
tional elements required in those cases.252 
If the story ended here, it would be hard to suggest that scrapers today are 
on better legal footing than they were in the early 2000s. Indeed, the situation 
 
 244 See id. at 1067. 
 245 Id. n.3. 
 246 CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 597 Fed. App’x. 116 (3d Cir. 2015); Fidlar 
Techs. v. LPS Real Estate Data Sols., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 844 (C.D. Ill. 2015), aff’d, 810 
F.3d 1075 (7th Cir. 2016); EarthCam, Inc. v. OxBlue Corp., 49 F. Supp. 3d 1210 (N.D. Ga. 
2014), aff’d, 703 Fed. App’x. 803 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 247 See CollegeSource, 597 Fed. App’x. at 130 (“[Defendant] obtained the materials in 
question without breaching any technological barrier or contractual term of use”). The court 
also refers to code-based mechanisms of authorization in some of its discussion. See id. at 
129 (noting that defendants were not shown to have “hacked into technologically seques-
tered portions of the database”). 
 248 See Fidlar, 810 F.3d at 1082 (“We see no reason why LPS should have inferred that it 
could not download records through a completely different program that it designed. LPS’s 
access to records was tied to the individual agreements with each county—agreements that 
did not require LPS to use the Laredo client and that Fidlar was not even party to”). 
 249 See supra note 202–204 and accompanying text. 
 250 See EarthCam, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 1232. 
 251 EarthCam, Inc. v. OxBlue Corp., 703 Fed. App’x 803, 809–10 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 252 See, e.g., Fidlar, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 845 (no intent to defraud); QVC, Inc. v. Resultly, 
LLC, 99 F. Supp. 3d 525, 542-43 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (preliminary injunction order denied un-
der § 1030(a)(5)(A) claim, as the court doubted scraper intended to take down website). 
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may have even deteriorated, as a website need only preface a lawsuit with a 
cease-and-desist letter to lay the grounds for a CFAA claim; should the user 
access the website again, regardless of the grounds for objection, the nature of 
the scraper’s access, or how public the website was, they will have violated the 
CFAA.253 Most recently, however, three courts have pulled away from the 
broad, revocation-based theory of CFAA liability, presenting a possible 
framework for future interpretations of the statute in web scraping cases that is 
more sensitive to both the technical similarities between web scraping and web 
browsing and the odd result of legally banning one user from a website that all 
others are allowed to access. 
D. Today: Revisiting Application of the CFAA to Public Websites 
In the past few months a trio of opinions have presented a contrary frame-
work to the broad, revocation-based theory that has risen over the past few 
years. The first case to do so was hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., which the 
Northern District of California decided in August of last year and is presently 
on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.254 The facts of the case bear a striking similarity 
to those in 3Taps.255 The popular business-oriented social network LinkedIn 
sent a cease-and-desist letter and imposed an IP block against a scraper who 
had used publicly-facing LinkedIn information to offer business analytics to its 
customers.256 The scraper in turn brought a declaratory judgment action against 
the website, seeking a declaration that it did not violate the CFAA, and the 
court did in fact enjoin LinkedIn from “preventing hiQ’s access, copying, or 
use of public profiles on LinkedIn’s website” while the case was pending.257 
While scholars quickly noted this atypical result, it is far from the first case to 
raise concerns about application of the CFAA to public websites.258 Nor was 
 
 253 One of the only upper limits noted by the courts at this time comes from the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s decision in Power Ventures, which suggested that that a system where “an automatic 
boilerplate revocation follows a violation of a website’s terms of use” might be too close to 
a pure use restriction to be consistent with Nosal I. See Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, 
Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1067 n.1 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 254 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099 (N.D. Cal. 2017), appeal filed No. 17-16783 (9th Cir. filed Sept. 
6, 2017). 
 255 See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 3Taps appears to think so too, as it has 
now filed a declaratory judgment action against LinkedIn seeking a similar injunction 
against LinkedIn blocking its scraping. That case has now been stayed pending the outcome 
of the hiQ case. Stipulation and Order, Dkt. No. 10, 3Taps, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., No. 18-
cv-855 (N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 7, 2018). 
 256 hiQ Labs, 273 F. Supp. 3d at 1104. 
 257 Id. at 1120. 
 258 See, e.g., CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., No. 10-3542, 2012 WL 5269213, 
at *14 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2012) (“[B]ecause the documents [at] issue were available to the 
general public, AcademyOne did not access them without authorization.”); Sw. Airlines Co. 
v. BoardFirst L.L.C., No. 3:06-CV-0891-B, 2007 WL 4823761, at *13–14 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 
12, 2007) (in a non-scraping case, discussing the disputed authority around using terms of 
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this the first case to enjoin a website against blocking access to a scraper. A 
month before, the Western District of Wisconsin had issued a similar injunc-
tion in an antitrust case involving a software scraper, though that injunction 
was vacated on appeal.259 
In rejecting LinkedIn’s claim of unauthorized access, the HiQ Labs court 
distinguished the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Power Ventures on the grounds 
that the data in that case was not “public,” as one can only access Facebook 
content with a username and password.260 The court cited in passing the 3Taps 
case — which suggested the possibility of CFAA liability for accessing a pub-
lic website — but signaled disagreement with that result, saying that “whether 
‘access’ to a publicly viewable site may be deemed ‘without authorization’ un-
der the CFAA where the website hosts purports to revoke permission is not 
free from ambiguity.”261 The court went on to cite Nosal I to support the notion 
that Congress, in passing the CFAA, meant to embrace hacking in the more 
traditional sense, rather than more ambiguous forms of unauthorized access.262 
The court supported this interpretation with policy considerations, noting that 
assigning CFAA liability when someone accesses a website in contravention of 
a written instruction would “effectuat[e] the digital equivalence of Medusa,” 
and would leave open the possibility that website owners could block users for 
discriminatory, anticompetitive, or other improper reasons.263 This is an echo 
of the same concern raised by the First Circuit in the early scraping case EF 
Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp.264 Finally, the court also cited an influential 
article by Orin Kerr, which argued for an interpretation of the CFAA that rec-
ognizes the “inherent openness of the web.”265 
In the second case, decided earlier this year, the Ninth Circuit signaled a 
possible change in its thinking around scraping with its decision in Oracle 
USA, Inc. v. Rimini Street, Inc.266 The case concerned a software support ser-
vice that scraped a website containing manuals and technical material for the 
 
service on publicly-accessible websites to impute unauthorized access under the CFAA); 
Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV 99-7654 HLH(BQRX), 2000 WL 525390, 
at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000) (noting in a trespass to chattels case that “it is hard to see 
how entering a publicly available web site could be called a trespass, since all are invited to 
enter.”). 
 259 Authenticom, Inc. v. CDK Global, LLC, No. 17-cv-318-jdp, 2017 WL 3017048 (W.D. 
Wisc. July 14, 2017), vacated, 874 F.3d 1019 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 260 hiQ Labs, 273 F. Supp. 3d at 1109. 
 261 Id. 
 262 Id. at 1109–10. 
 263 Id. at 1110–11. 
 264 See supra notes 171–172 and accompanying text. 
 265 hiQ Labs, 273 F. Supp. 3d at 1111 (citing Kerr, Norms, supra note 116, at 1162). The 
court in Power Ventures similarly cites this article, but proceeds to then find that this pre-
sumption of openness can be revoked. See Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 
1058, 1067 n.2 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 266 879 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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major enterprise software provider Oracle, so that the service could provide 
more effective assistance to Oracle users.267 Oracle brought a claim under the 
California and Nevada equivalents to the CFAA, alleging that Rimini Street 
scraped the website in violation of its terms of service.268 The Ninth Circuit 
held that the scraper had at least some level of access to the public website, and 
therefore could not have accessed the site “without authorization,” as the 
scraper did in Power Ventures.269 Nor did the scraper “exceed authorized ac-
cess,” as the court found that the terms only limited the “method” of accessing 
information, instead of limiting the access itself.270 
The Ninth Circuit characterized its decision as consistent with both Power 
Ventures and its earlier opinions in the Oracle litigation, and on first blush, this 
result appears to be a consistent with the cases discussed in Section III.C 
above.271 The opinion, however, neglected to mention a key fact that would 
seem to put the case in tension with these decisions — specifically, that Oracle 
allegedly told Rimini Street to stop scraping, and blocked its IP to prevent fur-
ther access, which Rimini Street then circumvented.272 This is precisely the 
sort of behavior that the “revocation” line of cases, including Power Ventures, 
found to generate liability.273 The Oracle court did not mention either the IP 
blocks or the communication from Oracle, and instead focused its analysis on 
the text of the terms of use itself, although it added a slight hedge in its lan-
guage by noting that Rimini Street had authorization “at least at the time when 
it took the data in the first instance.”274 Unless the Ninth Circuit meant to say 
that once a scraper begins to scrape a website with authorization it can com-
plete the process even if it receives an objection — which would be a novel 
theory in the CFAA caselaw — that statement seems to be in tension with the 
 
 267 Id. at 952. 
 268 Id. 
 269 Id. at 962. 
 270 Id. 
 271 Id. (citing Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini St., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 3d 1134, at 1139–40 (D. 
Nev. 2016)). 
 272 Oracle, 191 F. Supp. 3d at 1140. 
 273 Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Face-
book expressly rescinded . . . permission when Facebook issued its written cease and desist 
letter to Power[.]”); CouponCabin LLC v. Savings.com, Inc., No. 2:14-CV-39-TLS, 2016 
WL 3181826, at *4 (N.D. Ind. June 8, 2016) (“By alleging that the Defendants knowingly 
and intentionally circumvented the Plaintiff’s security measures after the Plaintiff blocked 
access . . . and communicated with the Defendants by demanding they cease and desist 
scraping-related activities, the Plaintiff has pled enough facts to survive dismissal.”); 
Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1184 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (“Craigslist af-
firmatively communicated its decision to revoke 3Taps’ access through its cease-and-desist 
letter and IP blocking efforts.”). 
 274 Oracle, 879 F.3d at 962. 
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facts below.275 The court may have meant instead to suggest that a letter or 
technical block effectuating a revocation must be based on a legitimate, extra-
neous legal reason to hold any weight, which would explain its focus on the 
underlying contractual terms. This, however, would also seem to be in tension 
with the approach taken in 3Taps and Power Ventures, which did not consider 
why the websites revoked access to their servers.276 
The third case of this period was also the first to bring serious constitutional 
challenges to applications of the CFAA that prohibit web scraping: the District 
court for the District of Columbia’s case Sandvig v. Sessions.277 Sandvig was 
brought by a group of scholars and journalists who used web scraping and oth-
er technical tools as part of their research.278 They were aware that the terms of 
service on many of the platforms they studied banned the techniques that they 
had used, including scraping, use of “sock puppet” accounts, and other com-
mon computational social science techniques.279 The researchers argued that 
the First Amendment should bar enforcement of the CFAA based on such vio-
lations, as it implicated their rights to record or preserve information, and to 
publish the information that they found.280 The court agreed that scraping 
“plausibly falls within the ambit of the First Amendment,” and added: 
That plaintiffs wish to scrape data from websites rather than manually 
record information does not change the analysis. Scraping is merely a 
technological advance that makes information collection easier; it is not 
meaningfully different from using a tape recorder instead of taking writ-
ten notes, or using the panorama function on a smartphone instead of tak-
ing a series of photos from different positions. And . . . the information 
plaintiffs seek is located in a public forum. Hence, plaintiffs’ attempts to 
record the contents of public websites for research purposes are arguably 
affected with a First Amendment interest.281 
In the end, the court did not decide whether this First Amendment interest 
superseded the governmental interests in the CFAA, as the court determined 
that scraping “fall[s] outside of the CFAA’s reach” altogether.282 The court ex-
pressly adopted the “narrow” view of the CFAA discussed in Section III.B. 
above, and found that under this view, “[s]craping or otherwise recording data 
from a site that is accessible to the public is merely a particular use of infor-
 
 275 See Oracle, 191 F. Supp. 3d at 1140 (noting that Rimini “continue[d] to download 
files” despite the blocks and warnings). 
 276 See Power Ventures, 844 F.3d at 1069; Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 
1178, 1185 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 277 No. 16-cv-1368 (JDB), 2018 WL 1568881(D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2018). 
 278 Id. at *2. In the interest of full disclosure, I know some of the plaintiffs through our 
mutual academic circles. 
 279 See Id. 
 280 Id. at *7. 
 281 Id. 
 282 Id. at *16. 
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mation that plaintiffs are entitled to see.”283 The court’s holding in Sandvig 
rendered this particular technique of research outside the ambit of ongoing 
constitutional challenge to the CFAA, but in a way that limited application of 
the CFAA to scraping altogether.  
Because Sandvig presented a pre-enforcement challenge to the statute the 
court was not required to consider a situation where the subject of the research 
might have caught wind of the scraping and issued a letter expressly revoking 
access. But based on the analysis applied by the court, it would seem that such 
claims would face greater scrutiny than the purpose-blind approach taken by 
the courts in the cases in Section III.C. The Sandvig court notes, citing a recent 
Supreme Court case, that the public-facing Internet is “too heavily suffused 
with First Amendment activity, and what might otherwise be deemed private 
spaces are too blurred with expressive spaces, to sustain a direct parallel to the 
physical world,”284 and because the public should have a general right to ac-
cess publicly-facing websites, only code-based controls should be the basis of 
CFAA liability.285 This approach would perfectly align the CFAA with the 
technical realities of web scraping described in Section II, though it may not 
fully answer the question of how to deal with technically-imposed blocks that 
are motivated by a speech-suppressing purpose, such as an IP block placed to 
prevent a critic from scraping data from a public website. It again raises the 
question – first raised by the First Circuit fifteen years ago – whether an even 
greater public policy limitation should inform CFAA claims based on general-
ly-public websites.286 
CONCLUSION 
At this point it would be absurd to suggest that web scraping could, or 
should, be generally prohibited. Indeed, many forms of web scraping provide 
important benefits to consumers and the public.287 But the legal status of web 
scraping has gone through twenty years of uncertainty — not a single, incoher-
ent mess as some scholars have suggested, but a status that has ebbed and 
flowed at different points. After its broad application for about a decade, courts 
narrowed application to the CFAA, which then gave way to broadening by 
means of judicial-adoption of the “revocation” theory,288 and now recent deci-
 
 283 Id. 
 284 Id. at *5 (citing Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017)). 
 285 Id. (“[S]imply placing contractual conditions on accounts that anyone can create, as 
social media and many other sites do, does not remove a website from the First Amendment 
protections of the public Internet. If it did, then Packingham—which examined a law that 
limited access to websites that require user accounts for full functionality—would have 
come out the other way.”). 
 286 See supra notes 171-173 and accompanying text; EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer 
Corp., 318 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 287 See, e.g., GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2018). 
 288 See supra Parts III.A. - III.C. 
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sions have narrowed the CFAA once more —recognizing that both the public 
interest in public web scraping and the technical similarities between web 
scraping and web browsing should limit application of the CFAA to web 
scraping.289 
As web scraping litigation enters its third decade, there are a few key issues 
that courts will have to resolve in order to bring further clarity regarding the 
CFAA to scrapers and websites alike.  
First, and perhaps most obviously, courts should determine how to resolve 
the tension presented in the “revocation” cases discussed in Section III.C and 
those finding a more general right to access and scrape in Section III.D. This 
may at heart mean that courts will need to develop a coherent method of deal-
ing with conflicting authorizations to a computer under the CFAA, across dif-
ferent mechanisms. For example, many of these cases present situations where 
a scraper’s access to a website is authorized under code-based mechanisms 
(e.g., the website’s server is online and configured to receive and process 
HTTP requests from the scraper) but unauthorized through another mechanism 
(e.g., the website sent the scraper a letter that says they are no longer wel-
come). It is not clear whether courts have fully confronted conflicting authori-
zation under the CFAA, and established a means of mitigating such authoriza-
tions.290 The closest they have come in web scraping cases is in situations 
where the scraper uses a third party’s account to access the site with permis-
sion of the account holder, but not of the website. Those cases tend to favor the 
website’s authorization over the account holder’s authorization, but without 
much consideration of the question.291 
Second, there is an authorization mechanism that is widely used on the tech-
nical side yet conspicuously absent from the legal discussion, which should be 
brought into the analysis. Courts in scraping cases have yet to meaningfully 
consider what to do with the existing quasi-technical tool that websites and 
scrapers have used to broker a relationship for the past two decades: the Robots 
Exclusion Standard, or “robots.txt” standard.292 This standard provides a vehi-
cle for websites to express whether or not they wish to allow scrapers on their 
website, where on the website scrapers should be included or excluded, and 
whether the HTTP queries the scraper generates should be slowed to avoid 
overwhelming a website.293 Under this protocol a website operator can place a 
text file in the top-level directory of its website, entitled “robots.txt,” and then 
set forth its access rules for scrapers in a source-code-like language readable to 
 
 289 See supra Part III.D. 
 290 For a recent case unpacking questions of the proper party of authorization, see Philips 
Med. Sys. P.R. Inc. v. GIS Partners Corp., 203 F. Supp. 3d 221, 234–35 (D.P.R. 2016). 
 291 See supra notes 164, 202–204, 249–251. For scholarly discussion of this question, see 
Kerr, Norms, supra note 116, at 1178–80. 
 292 See GOURLEY & TOTTY, supra note 37, at 229–35. 
 293 See id. 
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humans and scrapers alike.294 Most instructional literature for scrapers encour-
ages them to follow this protocol when scraping.295 Courts in copyright cases 
have begun analyzing whether adherence to this protocol is in effect a license 
that allows the scraper to make the copy it inherently generates when scrap-
ing.296 But few courts have considered its application under the CFAA, and 
none have gone so far as to suggest that it can be used to demonstrate author-
ized access to a website.297 Bringing this commonly-employed tool into the 
analysis of the CFAA may provide web scrapers with guidance that they can 
more easily understand and effectuate. 
And finally, courts may need to more fully consider whether the publicly-
accessible nature of most popular websites compel courts to review CFAA 
claims more carefully where such sites revoke access for a single person — 
whether the sites revoke access by way of a cease-and-desist letter, a technical 
block, or any other mechanism. As the Sandvig court noted, there is a fluid re-
lationship between private websites and the public web, and many socially 
beneficial reasons that a person may want to scrape another’s website without 
permission in this quasi-public space.298 And because most scrapers, if de-
signed appropriately, would be highly similar to the level of access of a human 
browser,299 courts should raise an eyebrow at a claim that a scraper should be 
 
 294 About robots.txt, WEB ROBOTS PAGES, http://www.robotstxt.org/robotstxt.html 
[https://perma.cc/7YLT-XDCD] (last visited Mar. 8, 2018). 
 295 See, e.g., HEMENWAY & CALISHAIN, supra note 37, at 46 (“If you’re planning on re-
leasing your scraper or spider into the wild, it’s important that you make every possible at-
tempt to support robots.txt.”). 
 296 See, e.g., Parker v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 07-2757, 2008 WL 4410095, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 
Sept. 25, 2008) (suggesting, but not deciding, that the knowing omission of a robots.txt file 
could be grounds to establish an implied license under copyright law); Field v. Google Inc., 
412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1117 (D. Nev. 2006) (plaintiff’s knowing use of the robots.txt proto-
col estopped him from arguing that defendant’s copying was infringement); but see Associ-
ated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537, 563–64 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(rejecting use of robots.txt to claim an implied license, when the copyright owner was not 
the operator of the websites in question). 
 297 See DHI Grp., Inc. v. Kent, No. H-16-1670, 2017 WL 4837730, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 
26, 2017) (using the protocol to inform plaintiff’s anticircumvention claim, but not its 
CFAA claim); QVC, Inc. v. Resultly, LLC, 159 F. Supp. 3d 576, 586 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (in 
the same case, rejecting claim that plaintiff’s prior statements discussing the robots.txt pro-
tocol meant it was judicially estopped from claiming access without authorization); QVC, 
Inc. v. Resultly, LLC, 99 F. Supp. 3d 525, 539 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (noting that defendant ad-
hered to “crawl delays” articulated in a robots.txt file, but not using the protocol to inform 
the question of authorized access); Healthcare Advocates, Inc. v. Harding, Earley, Follmer 
& Frailey, 497 F. Supp. 2d 627, 643 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (extensively analyzing the protocol as 
it relates to plaintiff’s claim under copyright’s anticircumvention law, but not as it relates to 
the plaintiff’s CFAA claim); eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1062 
(N.D. Cal. 2000) (mentioning the protocol, but not applying it in that case). 
 298 Sandvig v. Sessions, No. 16-cv-1368 (JDB), 2018 WL 1568881 at * 5 (Mar. 30, 2018). 
 299 See supra Part II. 
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viewed as an invasive criminal trespasser. It may be that the platform’s true 
motivations are actually anticompetitive, speech-suppressing, or otherwise un-
trustworthy. As the hiQ Labs decision put it: 
Website owners could, for example, block access by individuals or 
groups on the basis of race or gender discrimination. Political campaigns 
could block selected news media, or supporters of rival candidates, from 
accessing their websites. Companies could prevent competitors or con-
sumer groups from visiting their websites to learn about their products or 
analyze pricing. Further . . . [a] broad reading of the CFAA could stifle 
the dynamic evolution and incremental development of state and local 
laws addressing the delicate balance between open access to information 
and privacy—all in the name of a federal statute enacted in 1984 before 




There are countless uses of web scraping. Some are good. Some are bad. 
Some are bad for the website but should be allowed for the good of the pub-
lic.301 The past twenty years of CFAA web scraping litigation have slowly 
worked their way towards a broader appreciation of the nature and potential 
benefits of scraping. A more detailed look at the actual technical function of 
scraping shows that scraping should not be thought of as inherently more inva-
sive or dangerous than a person at a web browser. And with a few key areas of 
doubt cleared away, one can hope that the constant legal uncertainty expressed 
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